How is working memory content consciously experienced? The ‘conscious copy’ model of WM introspection

Jacobs, Christianne; Silvanto, Juha

doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2015.06.003

Cited by 41 publications

(36 citation statements)

References 72 publications

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“…There are four well known instances where scholars invoke copying of information in the brain: (i) the transfer of information from short to long-term memory 35, 51, 52 , (ii) the transfer of information from specialized cortical areas to working memory 53 or to the global workspace 54, 55 and, finally (iii) the possible copying of patterns from working memory to conscious processing 56 . Undoubtedly, all these approaches require accurate information transfer between different brain components 57 .…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The non-conscious or implicit working memory, which has received considerable attention lately 46, 56 , is crucial for our proposed mechanism. Irrespective of whether working memory overlaps with the conscious domain 59 or not 56 (in the latter case a ‘conscious copy’ must be sent from working memory to conscious access), the important factor is that the bound on the number of patterns that can be held in the unconscious part of the working memory is larger than that of the conscious working memory 59 .…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Irrespective of whether working memory overlaps with the conscious domain 59 or not 56 (in the latter case a ‘conscious copy’ must be sent from working memory to conscious access), the important factor is that the bound on the number of patterns that can be held in the unconscious part of the working memory is larger than that of the conscious working memory 59 . In other words, our mechanism suggests that the total storage capacity of the unconscious network population is much higher than that of the conscious one.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Breeding novel solutions in the brain: A model of Darwinian neurodynamics

et al. 2017

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The fact that surplus connections and neurons are pruned during Background development is well established. We complement this selectionist picture by a proof-of-principle model of evolutionary search in the brain, that accounts for new variations in theory space. We present a model for Darwinian evolutionary search for candidate solutions in the brain.: We combine known components of the brain -recurrent neural Methods networks (acting as attractors), the action selection loop and implicit working memory -to provide the appropriate Darwinian architecture. We employ a population of attractor networks with palimpsest memory. The action selection loop is employed with winners-share-all dynamics to select for candidate solutions that are transiently stored in implicit working memory.: We document two processes: selection of stored solutions and Results evolutionary search for novel solutions. During the replication of candidate solutions attractor networks occasionally produce recombinant patterns, increasing variation on which selection can act. Combinatorial search acts on multiplying units (activity patterns) with hereditary variation and novel variants appear due to (i) noisy recall of patterns from the attractor networks, (ii) noise during transmission of candidate solutions as messages between networks, and, (iii) spontaneously generated, untrained patterns in spurious attractors.: Attractor dynamics of recurrent neural networks can be used to Conclusions model Darwinian search. The proposed architecture can be used for fast search among stored solutions (by selection) and for evolutionary search when novel candidate solutions are generated in successive iterations. Since all the suggested components are present in advanced nervous systems, we hypothesize that the brain could implement a truly evolutionary combinatorial search system, capable of generating novel variants. Keywords

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Breeding novel solutions in the brain: A model of Darwinian neurodynamics

et al. 2017

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“…However, because not all cognitive processing leads to conscious experience (52,(58)(59)(60)(61)(62), cognitive capacities indicated by nonverbal behavior alone are generally not sufficient to demonstrate conscious awareness (for further discussion of the measurement of consciousness through verbal and nonverbeal means, see SI Appendix, Box 3, and for discussion of nonconscious cognition, especially nonconscious working memory, see SI Appendix, Box 4).…”

Section: Consciousness In Contemporary Philosophy Cognitive Sciencementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Included are theories that emphasize attention and working memory (47,55,57,59,(103)(104)(105)(106)(107)(108)(109), processing by a global workspace (56,110,111), or the interpretation of experience (112). A common thread that runs through various cognitive theories is that processing beyond the sensory cortex is required for conscious experience.…”

Section: Consciousness In Contemporary Philosophy Cognitive Sciencementioning

confidence: 99%

A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness

LeDoux

Brown

2017

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

438

417

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Emotional states of consciousness, or what are typically called emotional feelings, are traditionally viewed as being innately programmed in subcortical areas of the brain, and are often treated as different from cognitive states of consciousness, such as those related to the perception of external stimuli. We argue that conscious experiences, regardless of their content, arise from one system in the brain. In this view, what differs in emotional and nonemotional states are the kinds of inputs that are processed by a general cortical network of cognition, a network essential for conscious experiences. Although subcortical circuits are not directly responsible for conscious feelings, they provide nonconscious inputs that coalesce with other kinds of neural signals in the cognitive assembly of conscious emotional experiences. In building the case for this proposal, we defend a modified version of what is known as the higher-order theory of consciousness.uch progress has been made in conceptualizing consciousness in recent years. This work has focused on the question of how we come to be aware of our sensory world, and has suggested that perceptual consciousness emerges via cognitive processing in cortical circuits that assemble conscious experiences in real-time. Emotional states of consciousness, on the other hand, have traditionally been viewed as involving innately programmed experiences that arise from subcortical circuits.Our thesis is that the brain mechanisms that give rise to conscious emotional feelings are not fundamentally different from those that give rise to perceptual conscious experiences. Both, we propose, involve higher-order representations (HORs) of lowerorder information by cortically based general networks of cognition (GNC). Thus, subcortical circuits are not responsible for feelings, but instead provide lower-order, nonconscious inputs that coalesce with other kinds of neural signals in the cognitive assembly of conscious emotional experiences by cortical circuits (the distinction between cortical and subcortical circuits is defined in SI Appendix, Box 1). Our theory goes beyond traditional higher-order theory (HOT), arguing that self-centered higherorder states are essential for emotional experiences.Emotion, Consciousness, and the Brain Detailed understanding of the emotional brain, and theorizing about it, is largely based on studies that fall under the heading of "fear." We will therefore focus on this body of work in discussing emotional consciousness. In light of this approach, we define "fear" as the conscious feeling one has when in danger. Although our conclusions may not apply equally well to all emotions, we maintain that the lessons from fear provide general principles that can at least be used as a starting point for theorizing about many emotions.The Amygdala Fear Circuit View. Emotions like fear are often said to have been inherited from animal ancestors (1-6). These "basic emotions" are typically proposed to be wired into the brain's limbic system (7). Although the limbic sy...

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