No abstract

This paper uses the differential game approach to construct a model of cooperative emission reduction involving the government, manufacturing firms, and retail firms under different power structures. It is found that the dominant player receives more subsidies; the development of a mechanism for horizontal technology R&D among enterprises can reduce the financial pressure on the government to implement compensation strategies and improve the effectiveness and performance of supply chain emission reduction; and the government can develop differentiated subsidy schemes to achieve Pareto optimality in the supply chain and environmental performance based on different game strategies and revenue-sharing agreements by enterprises.

No abstract

Along with the deep comprehension and accumulated practice of corporate social responsibility (CSR), people are increasingly aware of the positive role of the government in the development of CSR. Chinese governments at all levels have issued many policies to guide and regulate CSR behavior in Chinese enterprises. However, there has been little research on the evaluation of CSR policy’s effectiveness. In this paper, we conducted a text analysis of 76 corporate social responsibility policies (CSRPs) and statistics of high-frequency words. Based on the existing policy evaluation index system, combined with the characteristics of CSRPs, we constructed a CSRPs content evaluation index system based on the policy modeling consistency index (PMC-index) model. Additionally, we conducted content analysis and quantitative evaluation of six CSRPs selected from different levels and regions of government agencies. The results show that the evaluation levels of the six policies were all good, which could play a positive role in the CSR development of their policy objectives. However, policies in different regions show obvious differences in the design of implementation suggestions and incentive and constraint measures, and there is a large space for further optimization. This study not only provides specific policy optimization suggestions for the government and enterprises based on case studies but also provides methods for evaluating the content of CSRPs, filling the research gap in this field.

Based on differential game theory, this paper constructs a centralized game model, a Nash noncooperative game model and a game model with a cost-sharing contract. This paper discusses the interactive game strategy between the central government's participation in subsidies and the upstream and downstream sharing of the cost of pollution control, and we obtain and compare the optimal feedback strategies and trajectory of pollution control with time upstream and downstream of a basin. The introduction of the game model for cost-sharing contracts not only maximizes the benefits in the basin but also increases the amount of pollution control, improves the ecological environment of the basin, and enhances its capital attractiveness. In addition, it is found that the central government's subsidies have an impact on the decisionmaking behavior of local governments, especially in the case of introducing cost-sharing contracts. Central government subsidies can increase the enthusiasm of upstream and downstream local governments for longterm cooperation in pollution control and emission reduction.INDEX TERMS eco-compensation, differential game, cost sharing construct, basin social welfare