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We examine the role of a practice’s opacity (versus transparency) in the interorganizational diffusion of organizational practices. Though the opacity of a practice is typically thought to impede diffusion, a political-cultural approach to institutions suggests that opacity can sometimes play a positive role. Given that adoption decisions are embedded in a web of conflicting interests, transparency may bring negative attention that, when observed by prospective adopters, inhibits them from following suit. Opacity, in contrast, helps avoid that cycle. Using the curtailment of health benefits for retirees among large U.S. employers (1989 to 2009), we compare the diffusion of transparent adoptions (i.e., partial or complete benefit cuts) with opaque adoptions (i.e., spending caps that trigger disenrollment). We find that transparent adoptions reduce subsequent diffusion of the practice to other organizations. This effect is fully mediated by negative media coverage, which is itself conditioned by the presence of opposition from interest groups. Opaque adoptions, in contrast, increase subsequent diffusion to other organizations and are facilitated by the involvement of professional experts. Thus, in addition to providing findings on practice opacity, our study contributes insight into how organizational fields shape diffusion by illuminating the role of third parties in the spread of controversial practices.

Research Summary We consider the link between firms' decisions to adopt a CSR executive position and the political ideology of prior adopter CEOs. We theorize that firms are more likely to adopt a CSR executive position when it has been previously adopted by conservative‐leaning CEOs at other firms, as opposed to liberal‐leaning CEOs. This effect is due, we argue, to the increased perceptual salience and situational attributions associated with ideologically incongruent actions (i.e., actions that appear inconsistent with known political values). We further posit that these effects are stronger when the observing firms experience increased salience of CSR issues due to shareholder pressure and institutional equivalence between the referent and the observing firms. We find support for these ideas in a longitudinal sample of Fortune 500 companies. Managerial Summary How do CEOs' values affect industry‐wide appointments of senior executives in charge of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)? Prior research suggests that liberal political beliefs of CEOs predict their CSR commitments. Our study explores how the political beliefs of CEOs—in this case, CEOs who have created a new CSR executive position in their companies—influence the likelihood that peer CEOs will imitate their decisions. Specifically, we find that when conservative CEOs adopt a CSR executive position, other companies are more likely to follow than when liberal‐leaning CEOs do so. These effects are even stronger when companies are experiencing CSR‐related pressure from shareholders and when they belong to the same industry and community as the firms of the CEOs they are observing.