Research summary: Why do firms vary so much in their stances toward corporate social responsibility (CSR)? Prior research has emphasized the role of external pressures, as well as CEO preferences, while little attention has been paid to the possibility that CSR may also stem from prevailing beliefs among the body politic of the firm. We introduce the concept of organizational political ideology to explain how political beliefs of organizational members shape corporate advances in CSR. Using a novel measure based on the political contributions by employees of Fortune 500 firms, we find that ideology predicts advances in CSR. This effect appears stronger when CSR is rare in the firm's industry, when firms are high in human capital intensity, and when the CEO has had long organizational tenure. Managerial summary: Why do firms vary in their stances toward corporate social responsibility (CSR)? Prior research suggests that companies engage in CSR when under pressure to do so, or when their CEOs have liberal values. We introduce the concept of organizational political ideology, and argue that CSR may also result from the values of the larger employee population. Introducing a novel measure of organizational political ideology, based on employees' donations to the two major political parties in the United States, we find that liberal‐leaning companies engage in more CSR than conservative‐leaning companies, and even more so when other firms in the industry have weaker CSR records, when the company relies heavily on human resources and when the company's CEO has a long organizational tenure. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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Studies of the effects of top management team (TMT) composition on organizational outcomes have yielded mixed and confusing results. A possible breakthrough resides in the reality that TMTs vary in how they are fundamentally structured. Some are structured such that members operate independently of each other, while others are set up such that roles are highly interdependent. We examine the potential for three facets of structural interdependence—horizontal, vertical, and reward interdependence—to resolve ambiguities regarding effects of TMT heterogeneity. Based on a sample of TMTs in technology firms, we find that the three facets of structural interdependence are potent moderators of two classic predictions: the positive association between TMT heterogeneity and member departures, and between TMT heterogeneity and firm performance. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

We investigate the dispositional sources of managerial discretion by theorizing that CEOs’ personality traits affect the extent to which their firms’ strategies reflect their preferences. In a longitudinal study of Fortune 500 firms, we examine the moderating influence of two personality traits—narcissism and extraversion—on the relationship between CEOs’ liberal- or conservative-leaning political ideologies and two firm strategies: corporate social responsibility (CSR) and workforce downsizing. We anticipate and confirm that liberal-leaning CEOs are more likely than others to enact CSR practices, and conservative-leaning CEOs are more likely than others to engage in downsizing. We find that extraversion strengthens these effects: it increases liberal CEOs’ use of CSR and conservative CEOs’ use of downsizing. Narcissism likewise strengthens the effect of CEO liberalism on CSR, but it does not significantly moderate the effect of CEO conservatism on downsizing. In a supplementary study using primary data from working professionals, we further explore the distinct mechanisms associated with these two personality traits. We find that narcissism relates strongly to individuals’ inflated perception of their discretion, whereas extraversion relates to their ability to sell an issue to others. Our study furthers research on managerial discretion by providing nuanced theory and evidence on innate sources of CEOs’ influence, and it enhances research on CEOs’ political ideology by spotlighting the dispositional boundary conditions of its effects on firms’ strategies.

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