A force-field theory of motivated cognition is presented and applied to a broad variety of phenomena in social judgment and self-regulation. Purposeful cognitive activity is assumed to be propelled by a driving force and opposed by a restraining force. Potential driving force represents the maximal amount of energy an individual is prepared to invest in a cognitive activity. Effective driving force corresponds to the amount of energy he or she actually invests in attempt to match the restraining force. Magnitude of the potential driving force derives from a combination of goal importance and the pool of available mental resources, whereas magnitude of the restraining force derives from an individual's inclination to conserve resources, current task demands, and competing goals. The present analysis has implications for choice of means to achieve one's cognitive goals as well as for successful goal attainment under specific force-field constellations. Empirical evidence for these effects is considered, and the underlying theory's integrative potential is highlighted. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).

In the presence of several objectives, goal conflict may be avoided via multifinal means, which advance all of the active goals at once. Because such means observe multiple constraints, they are fewer in number than the unconstrained means to a single goal. Five experimental studies investigated the process of choosing or generating such means for multiple goals. We found that the simultaneous activation of multiple goals restricted the set of acceptable means to ones that benefitted (or at least, did not harm) the entire set of active goals. Two moderators of this phenomenon were identified: (a) the feasibility of identifying multifinal means, which was dependent on the relations between the different active goals, and (b) the enhanced importance of the focal goal, which resulted in the inhibition of its alternatives and the consequent relaxation of multifinality constraints.

Widely used explicit memory tasks seem to overestimate age-related differences in memory performance. Social and personal factors may buffer or undermine the effect of age on memory performance. In two studies, the performance of older adults was compared with the performance of younger adults. Tasks were presented either as memory tasks or non-memory tasks. Older adults’ performance on a memory task improved when the task-instructions did not explicitly emphasize the memory component of the task. In the first study, results revealed that memory self-efficacy beliefs play a moderator role on the impact of task-instruction on memory performance, so that lower levels of memory self-efficacy correlate with lower performance in the memory emphasizing task condition but not in the orientation emphasizing task condition. In a second study actual performance expectations were measured. For older participants only, expectations were sensitive to task-instructions and mediated the relation between tasks-instructions and performances. These findings suggest that observed age-related differences in memory performance may be significantly exaggerated by the testing situation and by a low memory self-efficacy and low memory performance expectancies prevalent among older adults. Copyright # 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd

The construct of motivational readiness is introduced and explored. Motivational readiness is the willingness or inclination, whether or not ultimately realized, to act in the service of a desire. Building on prior relevant conceptions that include, among others, animal learning models (Hull, 1943; Spence, 1956; Tolman, 1955) and personality approaches (e.g., Atkinson, 1964; Lewin, 1935), a general theory of motivational readiness is presented. Major parameters of this theory include the magnitude of a Want state (i.e., individual's desire of some sort) and the Expectancy of being able to satisfy it. The Want is assumed to be the essential driver of readiness: Whereas some degree of readiness may exist in the absence of Expectancy, all readiness is abolished in the absence of desire (Want). The concept of incentive is conceptualized in terms of a Match between the contents of the Want and perceived situational affordances. Whereas in classic models incentive was portrayed as a first-order determinant of motivational readiness, it is depicted here as a second-order factor that affects readiness via its impact on the Want and/or the Expectancy. A heterogeneous body of evidence for the present theory is reviewed, converging from different domains of psychological research. The theory's relation to its predecessors and its unique implications for new research hypotheses are also discussed.

Like most behavior, consumer behavior too is goal driven. In turn, goals constitute cognitive constructs that can be chronically active as well as primed by features of the environment. Goal systems theory outlines the principles that characterize the dynamics of goal pursuit and explores their implications for consumer behavior. In this vein, we discuss from a common, goal systemic, perspective a variety of well known phenomena in the realm of consumer behavior including brand loyalty, variety seeking, impulsive buying, preferences, choices and regret. The goal systemic perspective affords guidelines for subsequent research on the dynamic aspects of consummatory behavior as well as offering insights into practical matters in the area of marketing.

Diverse facets of the multifinality configuration in goal-directed behavior are identified and empirically explored. The multifinality construct denotes a motivational structure wherein a single means is linked to several ends. A multifinality configuration maximizes value that a given means promises to deliver while sacrificing expectancy of attainment due to a dilution effect. Several phenomena implied by multifinality theory are investigated, including an unconscious quest for multifinal means, the constraints that such quest imposes on means to a focal goal, and structural conditions under which an activity may be experienced as intrinsically motivated. Multifinality phenomena appear in numerous domains of social cognition, and the present theory offers a novel perspective on classic motivational effects.

Addiction models have frequently invoked motivational mechanisms to explain the initiation and maintenance of addictive behaviors. However, in doing so, these models have emphasized the unique characteristics of addictive behaviors and overlooked the commonalities that they share with motivated behaviors in general. As a consequence, addiction research has failed to connect with and take advantage of promising and highly relevant advances in motivation and self-regulation research. The present article is a call for a convergence of the previous approaches to addictive behavior and the new advances in basic motivation and self-regulation. The authors emphasize the commonalities that addictive behaviors may share with motivated behavior in general. In addition, it is suggested that the same psychological principles underlying motivated action in general may apply to understand challenging aspects of the etiology and maintenance of addictive behaviors.

We present a psychological model of extremism based on the concept of motivational imbalance whereby a given need gains dominance and overrides other basic concerns. In contrast, moderation results from a motivational balance wherein individuals’ different needs are equitably attended to. Importantly, under moderation the different needs constrain individuals’ behaviors in prohibiting actions that serve some needs yet undermine others. Those constraints are relaxed under motivational imbalance where the dominant need crowds out alternative needs. As a consequence, the constraints that the latter needs exercise upon behavior are relaxed, permitting previously avoided activities to take place. Because enactment of these behaviors sacrifices common concerns, most people avoid them, hence their designation as extreme. The state of need imbalance has motivational, cognitive, behavioral, affective and social consequences. These pertain to a variety of different extremisms that share the same psychological core: extreme diets, extreme sports, extreme infatuations, diverse addictions, as well as violent extremism. Evidence for the present model cuts across different domains of psychological phenomena, levels of behavioral analysis and phylogeny. We consider the model’s implications for further research and explore the tradeoffs between extremism and moderation.