The energetics of motivated cognition: A force-field analysis.

Kruglanski, Arie W.; Bélanger, Jocelyn J.; Chen, Xiaoyan; Kőpetz, Catalina; Pierro, Antonio; Mannetti, Lucia

doi:10.1037/a0025488

Cited by 279 publications

(321 citation statements)

References 116 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

286

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…When people have simultaneous conflicting goals, they tend to either prioritize one over the other or attempt to compromise in such a way that both goals are (perceived to be) at least adequately satisfied (cf. Kruglanski et al, 2012;Kunda, 1990). Questionable practices are common, I believe, because they are often, but not always, an attempt at compromise between researchers' conflicting goals.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Lessons from Pinocchio: Cues to deception may be highly exaggerated

Luke¹

2018

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Deception researchers widely acknowledge that cues to deception -observable behaviors that may differ between truthful and deceptive messagestend to be weak. Nevertheless, several deception cues have been reported with unusually large effect sizes, and some researchers have advocated the use of such cues as tools for detecting deceit and assessing credibility in practical contexts. Examining data from empirical deception cue research and using a series of Monte Carlo simulations, I demonstrate that many estimated effect sizes of deception cues may be greatly inflated by publication bias, small numbers of estimates, and low power. Indeed, simulations indicate the informational value of the present deception literature is quite low, such that it is not possible to determine whether any given effect is real or a false positive. I warn against the hazards of relying on potentially illusory cues to deception and offer some recommendations for improving the state of the science of deception. A preprint of this document is available at https://osf.io/xt8fq/."That Marionette," continued the Talking Cricket, "is a rascal of the worst kind." (Collodi, 1883) In an effort to temper our hopes of catching lies with unerring accuracy, deception researchers often say there is no "Pinocchio's nose" (e.g., Frank, Menasco, & O'Sullivan, 2008;Hartwig & Bond, 2011;Vrij, 2006Vrij, , 2004. That is, there is no behavior that perfectly discriminates between truthful and deceptive messages. For all the talk about Pinocchio's nose, there are other more urgent lessons from the story of Pinocchio pertinent to deception research.In his adventures, Pinocchio causes mischief and mayhem, and among his many foibles is the ease with which he is tempted to do what is easy and immediately satisfying but ultimately dangerous, rather than what is difficult and responsible. * timothy.luke@psy.gu.se. For their helpful comments, suggestions, and inspiration, I am grateful to Fabi Alceste, Karl Ask, Charlie Bond, Will Crozier, Bella DePaulo, Emelie Ernberg, Pär Anders Granhag, Maria Hartwig, Lorraine Hope, Emily Joseph, Louise Jupe, Erik Mac Giolla, Patty Sanchez, Rebecca Willén, and three anonymous reviewers, as well as the many supportive others who provided encouragement and tolerated my ravings and rantings.

show abstract

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Lessons from Pinocchio: Cues to deception may be highly exaggerated

Luke¹

2018

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…For a goal-directed activity to be carried out, the magnitude of the effective driving force needs to match the magnitude of the restraining force, that is, supply the energy to do "what it takes" to effect goal pursuit. (Kruglanski et al, 2012) I fully agree with them that effort is a goaldirected activity. I also wholeheartedly agree with their presentation of the force-based account, and applaud their emphasis on the need to appeal to two forces to analyze effort, one exerted by the agent, the other resistive.…”

Section: Force-based Versus Resource-based Accounts Differences Betwementioning

confidence: 96%

“…The first reason is that forcebased accounts fit better with our ordinary understanding of effort. It is perhaps no accident that Kruglanski et al (2012) start by presenting their theory by appealing to the concept of force. From the point of view of commonsense and ordinary language, it is somewhat unnatural to describe and think of effort in terms of energy consumption or of investment of resources.…”

Section: In Favor Of Force-based Accountsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…(i) On the nature of muscular effort (Bannister, 1956;McArdle, Katch, & Katch, 2009;Nubar & Contini, 1961); (ii) On the nature of effort of attention (Kahneman, 1973) or cognitive effort (Ackerman, 2011; Kruglanski et al, 2012;Kurzban, Duckworth, Kable, & Myers, 2013;Westbrook & Braver, 2015), or on some aspect of such efforts, such as their subjective difficulty (Robinson & Morsella, 2014). (iii) On moral effort, effort of will, or effort to resist temptation (C. Campbell, 1939;Holton, 2009;Fehr, 2002;Knoch & Fehr, 2007).…”

Section: Work On Species Of Effortsmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Towards a definition of efforts.

Massin¹

2017

Motivation Science

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Although widely used across psychology, economics, and philosophy, the concept of effort is rarely ever defined. This article argues that the time is ripe to look for an explicit general definition of effort, makes some proposals about how to arrive at this definition, and suggests that a force-based approach is the most promising. Section 1 presents an interdisciplinary overview of some chief research axes on effort, and argues that few, if any, general definitions have been proposed so far. Section 2 argues that such a definition is now needed and proposes a basic methodology to arrive at it, whose first step is to make explicit the various tacit assumptions about effort made across sciences and ordinary thinking. Section 3 unearths 4 different conceptions of effort from research on effort so far: primitive-feelings accounts, comparator-based accounts, resource-based accounts and force-based accounts. It is then argued that the first 2 kinds of accounts, although interesting in their own right, are not strictly speaking about effort. Section 4 considers the 2 most promising general approaches to efforts: resource-based and force-based accounts. It argues that these accounts are not only compatible but actually extensionally equivalent. This notwithstanding, it explains why force-based accounts should be regarded are more fundamental than resource-based accounts.

show abstract

“…Unfortunately, this is not the case. Theorists and investigators tend to concur that effort pertains to the intensity of behavior (Brehm and Self 1989;Higgins 2006;Kahneman 1973;Kruglanski et al 2012). However, they have divergent views regarding its fundamental essence as well as key questions relevant to volition and phenomenology (Gollwitzer 1996;Locke 1996;Wegner 2002).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%