Parliaments and audit agencies have critical and complementary roles in the oversight of the budget and the enforcement of government accountability. Yet, the nexus between parliaments and audit agencies is one of the weakest links in the accountability chain, generating an accountability gap in the budget process. This articles analyses the interactions between parliaments and audit agencies in the oversight of government finances during the latter stages of the budget process. Using proxies to evaluate the quality of those linkages, such as the follow-up to audit findings and the discharge of government, it shows important dysfunctions in the interactions between parliaments and audit agencies due to a combination of technical capacity constraints and political economy disincentives. It suggests that the effective functioning of the system of checks and balances in public budgeting critically hinges on the agility of the linkages between accountability institutions. As such, the failure of budget accountability is due to systemic dysfunctions in the systems of accountability, rather than the failure of an individual accountability institution acting in isolation. In addition, the effectiveness of the horizontal accountability architecture depends on the political economy incentives shaping the budget process, which are generated by the interactions between the choice of institutional design and budget rules, with the degree of political competition and electoral rules.
This study reviews a decade of support by the World Bank and the Inter‐American Development Bank to parliaments and external audit agencies in Latin America. It underscores recent developments in development finance reflecting a broader understanding of the determinants of fiscal credibility and financial integrity. It reveals a learning curve in multilateral assistance to budget oversight institutions. It argues that there exists unexplored potential to improve the effectiveness of multilateral assistance to budget oversight institutions, including in the choice of strategies and instruments. More fundamentally, it underscores the need to tackle the underlying political economy of public finance accountability.
The parliamentary elections of May 2002 in Burkina Faso saw the ruling party loose its exclusionary grip on power. For the first time since the restoration of democracy in 1991, the parliamentary opposition now represents a sizeable group. While it retains the majority, the ruling party has to share legislative power with the opposition. These elections marginally alter the structure of power in a deeply presidential system of government. Several institutional and electoral reforms have played a critical role in strengthening the mechanisms of ‘vertical accountability’ and representative democracy. By assessing recent electoral reforms in Burkina Faso, the article underlines the importance of the electoral system in multiparty elections and thus contributes to our understanding of the effects of changes in electoral rules on the distribution of political outcomes. In particular, it underscores the contribution that institutional engineering and electoral reform can make to further democratisation in a semi-authoritarian context. While many challenges to democratic governance and the rule of law remain, the new political landscape holds the promise of changes in the style of government and the emergence of more consensual modes of governance.
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