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Data drawn from semistructured interviews with 40 active street‐level crack dealers are used to illustrate, apply, and expand the concept of restrictive deterrence. The article focuses on the perceptual shorthand dealers use to determine whether buyers in question are “narcs.” In presenting this shorthand, the article seeks to demonstrate how interactions among marketplace democratization (i.e., the idea of selling to as many different customers as possible to maximize profits), marketplace volatility, transactional brevity, and threats from law enforcement affect its complexity and refinement. Respondents operated out of a medium‐sized, midwestern metropolitan area (population: 2.2 million) within a central city of 390,000.

The first forays into Western criminological theory came in the language of deterrence (Beccaria, 1963 [1764]). The paradigm itself is simple and straightforward, offering an explanation for crime that doubles as a solution (Pratt et al., 2006). Crime occurs when the expected rewards outweigh the anticipated risks, so increasing the risks, at least theoretically, will prevent most crimes in most circumstances. If deterrence describes the perceptual process by which would‐be offenders calculate risks and rewards prior to offending, then deterrability refers to the offender's capacity and/or willingness to perform this calculation. The distinction between deterrence and deterrability is critical to understanding criminality from a utilitarian perspective. However, by attempting to answer “big picture” questions about the likelihood of offending relative to sanction threats, precious little scholarship has attended to the situated meaning of deterrability. This article draws attention to this lacuna in hopes of sensitizing criminology to an area of inquiry that, at present, remains only loosely developed.

Motivation is the central, yet arguably the most assumed, causal variable in the etiology of criminal behavior. Criminology's incomplete and imprecise understanding of this construct can be traced to the discipline's strong emphasis on background risk factors, open to the exclusion of subjective foreground conditions. In this article, we attempt to remedy this by exploring the decision‐making processes of active armed robbers in real‐life settings and circumstances. Our aim is to understand how and why these offenders move from an unmotivated state to one in which they are determined to commit robbery. Drawing from semistructured interviews with 86 active armed robbers, we argue that while the decision to commit robbery stems most directly from a perceived need for fast cash, this decision is activated, mediated, and shaped by participation in street culture. Street culture, and its constituent conduct norms, represents an essential intervening variable linking criminal motivation to background risk factors and subjective foreground conditions.

The notion that informal sanction threats inpuence criminal decision-making is perhaps the most important contribution to neoclassical theory in the past 15 years. Notably absent from this contribution is an examination of the ways in which the risk of victim retaliation-arguably, the ultimate informal sanction-mediates the process. The present article addresses this gap, examining how active drug robbers (individuals who take money and drugs from dealers by force or threat of force) perceive and respond to the risk of victim retaliation in real-life settings and circumstances. The data's theoretical implications for deterrence and violence contagions are explored. Data were drawn from in-depth interviews with 25 currently active drug robbers recruited from the streets of St. Louis, Missouri.

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Although studies on drug dealing have examined techniques sellers use to ensure against undercover infiltrations, none has explored the use of such techniques at the interactional level. The objective here is to address this void by exploring the perceptual shorthand dealers use to determine whether buyers in question are undercover. This perceptual shorthand processes one of two types of deception clues in making this judgment: trend discontinuity and interpersonal illegitimacy. Trend discontinuity is associated with police in formants and results from situations in which (I) familiar customers suddenly introduce unfamiliar others who wish to buy drugs and (2) familiar customers suddenly and signifcantly increase quantities they themselves desire to purchase. Interpersonal illegitimacy is associated with undercover agents and results from situations in which unfamiliar buyers emit certain physical and verbal “vibes” believed to be indicative of covert law en forcement personnel. Discussion focuses on the data's presuppositional and microstructural implications for restrictive deterrence (Gibbs, 1975). Data were drawn from semi‐structured interviews with 32 semi‐institutionalized heroin user‐dealers located in a very large western US. city.

Recent work in criminology has highlighted the central role of retaliation in shaping criminal violence in America's inner cities. Most of this work, however, has been based on male offenders. It has also failed to consider whether and how gender structures payback in reallife settings and circumstances. In this paper, we analyze in-depth, semistructured interviews with forty men and twelve women who recently engaged in one or more episodes of retaliatory violence to examine the ways in which gender shapes vengeance. W e hope to provide an insider's view of how gender frames the context and dynamics of retaliatory events for both men and women.