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Experience with contracting ______________________________________________ 5 Vertical integration as a "natural" solution_________________________________ 7 4. Applying the Lessons from Electricity Reforms to Telecommunications__10 HoldUp , Wholesale and Regulatory Uncertainty Risks in Telecommunications ______________________________________________________________________ 15

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Background: New Zealand's Primary Health Care Strategy (NZPHCS) was introduced in 2002. Its features are substantial increases in government funding delivered as capitation payments, and newly-created service-purchasing agencies. The objectives are to reduce health disparities and to improve health outcomes.

Policy reforms to primary health care delivery in New Zealand required governmentfunded firms overseeing care delivery to be constituted as nonprofit entities with governance shared between consumer and producers. This paper examines the consumer and producer interests in the allocation of ownership and control of New Zealand firms delivering primary health care utilising theories of competition in the markets for ownership and control of firms. Consistent with pre-reform patterns of ownership and control, provider interests appear to have exerted effective control over the formation and governance of the new entities in all but a few cases where community (consumer) control was already established. Their ability to do so is implied from the absence of a defined ownership stake via which the balance of governance control could shift as consequence of changes to incentives facing the different stakeholding groups. It appears that the pre-existing patterns will prevail and further intervention will be required if policymakers are to achieve their underlying aims.

Smart contracts have been proposed as a means of revolutionizing transacting between human actors and contributing to blockchain platforms substituting for many current institutions. However, the technical nature of blockchain platforms and smart contracts requires levels of certainty and foresight sufficient for contracts to be complete. We examine the technical and economic characteristics of blockchains and smart contracts to identify sources of uncertainty that may pose challenges to the ability of these technologies to displace existing institutional arrangements, in particular, the courts and other arbitration arrangements. Despite the development of alternative automated blockchain institutions such as the Kleros dispute resolution system, the case for smart contracts and blockchain applications to supplant real-world institutions remains weak. Inherent incompleteness due to limits to information availability, human cognition, and communication means that traditional contract governance institutions will continue to complement blockchain smart contract governance arrangements. The more complex and unique the transaction, the higher the value at risk, the harder to anticipate and precisely specify contingencies and measure and observe outcomes. Furthermore, the longer the time frame between agreement and execution, the less likely it is that smart contracting will be more efficient than traditional contracting.

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. AbstractBlockchains are the most well-known example of a distributed ledger technology (DLT). Unlike classic databases, the ledger is not maintained by any central authority. The integrity of the ledger is maintained automatically by an algorithmic consensus process whereby nodes vote and agree upon the authoritative version. In effect, the consensus algorithm operates in the manner of a decision-making process within a governance system.The technological characteristics of blockchain systems are well documented (Narayanan, Bonneau, Felton and Miller, 2016). We propose that one of the reasons why it has so far proved very difficult to seed large-scale commercial DLT (blockchain) projects lies in the arena of project ownership and governance. Unlike classic centralised database systems, DLTs have no one central point of "ownership" of any of the system's infrastructure or data.In this piece of exploratory research, we propose applying theories of club governance to both the technical design and operational development of a range of DLT (blockchain) systems, including (but not necessarily limited to) cryptocurrencies and enterprise applications to explore how they can explain the development of (or lack of development of) sustainable solutions to real business problems. There are many parallels to the governance arrangements observed historically in the origins of complex distributed telecommunications networks.

New Zealand offers a through-provoking case study of the effects of different competition and regulatory policies on broadband diffusion rates. Despite having one of the highest rates of Internet connection and usage in the OECD, widely available broadband infrastructure, and low broadband prices, broadband uptake per capita languishes in the bottom third of the OECD. While low uptake has typically been attributed to competition and regulatory factors associated with New Zealand’s ‘light-handed’ regulatory regime, this chapter proposes that a more credible explanation lies in a combination of New Zealand’s legacy of demand-side regulations, in particular the retail tariff options for voice telephony, and the limited value being derived by New Zealand residential consumers from the small range and narrow adoption of applications used currently that necessitate broadband connections. The New Zealand case illustrates the effect that legacy regulations can have on both the diffusion of new technologies per se and the choices made by consumers between different generational variants within that technology. The case indicates a need for more research on the effect of telecommunications industry regulations on demand-side uptake factors.