Structural separation versus vertical integration: Lessons for telecommunications from electricity reforms

Howell, Bronwyn; Meade, Richard; O’Connor, Seini

doi:10.1016/j.telpol.2010.05.003

Cited by 35 publications

(29 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…Residual rights are those rights that are not specified in contracts and allow a more efficient management of future situations (Foss & Foss, 2002;Hart, 1996;Rialp & Salas, 2002). Ownership can help a firm to adopt the governance form with the lowest cost (Howell et al, 2010).…”

Section: Theoretical Background and Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…With regard to transaction characteristics, TCE highlights the frequency of transactions, the uncertainty derived from asymmetric information, and the relation-specific investments that bind the parties and lead to hold-up problems as the main factors to consider in integrating an activity (Dekker, 2004;Eriksson & Laan, 2007;Howell et al, 2010;Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003).…”

Section: Theoretical Background and Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The majority of the academic literature focuses on legal aspects of the regulations that should be designed to control the behavior of vertically integrated operators (Cave, 2006;Crandall et al, 2010;Howell et al, 2010;Waterman & Choi, 2011). A few authors approach this topic from an economic perspective in analogous activities, like cable television (Waterman & Choi, 2011;Yoo, 2002) or the electric power industry (Howell et al, 2010), and from the perspective of governance forms in the mobile service (Reuver & Bouwman, 2012) and IT outsourcing industries (Goo & Huang, 2008). There is some discussion concerning network neutrality, but a few aspects, like ISP integration into other activities, have received little academic attention (Waterman & Choi, 2011).…”

Section: Research Design and Developmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In the same way, following the transactional background, we selected observable measures according to the descriptions of the characteristics of transactions (Clauß, 2012;Dekker, 2004;Eriksson & Laan, 2007;Howell et al, 2010;Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003) and according to the meanings of the mechanisms that organize action (Reuver & Bouwman, 2012) The hypotheses were contrasted using Structural Equation…”

Section: Research Design and Developmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Thus, a number of studies was conducted on the selection of the governance form by examining transaction characteristics (Crandall, Eisenach, & Litan, 2010;Howell et al, 2010;Neumann, 2010;Waterman & Choi, 2011), the definition of the control structure based on the transaction characteristics (Ding, Dekker, & Groot, 2013;Johansson & Siverbo, 2011;Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2000) and the influence of actionorganizing mechanisms on relationship outcomes (Reuver, 2011;Reuver & Bouwman, 2012;Eriksson & Laan, 2007;Langfield-Smith, 2008;Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003;Şengün & Wasti, 2011).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Mediated Effect of Formal and Informal Control on Governance Forms

López

Diz-Comesaña

2016

Rev. adm. empres.

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The present paper employs the perspective of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) to analyze the relevance of formal and informal controls in selecting the governance form. The evidence supports the influence of frequency, information sharing and relation-specific investments as a cause of control mechanisms, and the effect of these factors on the choice of the governance form, but there is no evidence about the combined interaction between these variables. The present work proposes that there is a mediation effect of formal and informal norms on the relationship between the TCE variables (frequency, information asymmetry and relation-specific investments) and the governance form. We applied Structural Equation Modelling to companies in the telecommunications sector in Spain. Our results confirm the opposite effect of formal and informal controls on the selection of governance forms and the mediation effect of these mechanisms of control on the selection of the governance form.KEYWORDS | Governance forms, integration, formal control, informal control, transaction characteristics. RESUMO O presente trabalho emprega o ponto de vista da Economia dos Custos de Transação (ECT) para analisar a relevância dos controles formais e informais na seleção da forma de governança. A evidência apoia a influência da frequência, compartilhamento de informações e investimentos específicos como causa dos mecanismos de controle, e o efeito desses fatores sobre a escolha da forma de governança. Entretanto não há nenhuma evidência sobre as interações entre essas variáveis. Este trabalho propõe que existe um efeito de mediação das normas informais e formais sobre a relação entre as variáveis da ECT (frequência, informações assimétricas e investimentos específicos) e a forma de governança. A Modelagem de Equações Estruturais é aplicada a empresas do setor de telecomunicações da Espanha. Os resultados obtidos confirmam o efeito oposto de controles formais e informais e o efeito de mediação dos mecanismos de controle sobre a seleção da forma de governança. PALAVRAS-CHAVE | Formas de governança, integração, controle formal, controle informal, caracterís-ticas da transação. RESUMEN El presente trabajo emplea la perspectiva de la Economía de los Costes de Transacción (ECT) para ana- RAE-Revista de Administração de Empresas | FGV/EAESP

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Section: Theoretical Background and Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%