Although a considerable literature identifies the conditions under which sanctions are more likely to be successful, few studies examine the question of when sanctioning states or senders are willing to enforce their sanctions laws against their firms. Using a game theoretic model, we argue that imposing sanctions creates a strategic dilemma for senders. We demonstrate that senders often have disincentives to enforce their sanctions policies, given that the restriction on economic transactions with targeted states may undermine their firms' competitiveness. The model indicates that sanctions are more likely to succeed when the sender's firm retains a moderate share of the target's market relative to its foreign competitors. However, the model also demonstrates that sanctions are likely to be imposed only when the conditions do not favor their success. The empirical implications of the model are tested using the Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions (TIES) data set.
ObjectiveTo compare the oncologic and obstetric outcomes in reproductive-age females with borderline ovarian tumors (BOTs) treated with cyst enucleation (CE) or unilateral salpingo-oophorectomy (USO).MethodsThe medical records of patients with BOTs treated between 1998 and 2014 were retrospectively reviewed. The recurrence rates in the USO and CE groups were compared, and the postoperative obstetric outcomes were assessed via telephone survey.ResultsEighty-nine patients with BOTs underwent USO, and 19 underwent CE. Of these, six patients had recurrent BOTs. The recurrence rate was significantly lower in the USO group (3/89, 3.4%) than in the CE group (3/19, 15.8%) (P=0.032). All patients with recurrent disease were successfully treated with further surgery. Of the 76 patients interviewed by telephone, 71 (93.4%) resumed regular menstruation after surgery. Twenty-six of the 32 patients (81.3%) who attempted to conceive had successful pregnancies. USO (19/24, 79.2%), like CE (7/8, 87.5%), resulted in favorable pregnancy rates for patients with BOTs.ConclusionUSO is a suitable fertility-preserving surgery for women with BOTs. CE is also an acceptable option for select patients.
Reciprocity refers to the character of the actions and reactions between two or more actors. This character is commonly one of responding in kind to the actions of another. As such, reciprocity is considered one of the fundamental processes observed by scholars in the study of international relations (IR). In the realm of international politics, the study of reciprocity typically encompasses formal/experimental and empirical research. Some scholars look at ethical dimensions and the propagation of norms such as the Golden Rule, while others undertake empirical analysis of patterns of reciprocity in search of answers to questions about the existence, predictability, and diffusion of reciprocity. As a concept, reciprocity has applications in a range of IR topics such as the basic ingredients of cooperation, the escalation and return of conflict, and the adherence to international law. Within the realm of conflict processes, the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) and formal frameworks are often used to represent arms races and similar security concerns. Related to the iterated PD is the work of Robert Axelrod, who demonstrated the robustness of the reciprocal strategy known as tit-for-tat (TFT). One puzzle on reciprocity that deserves consideration in future research is that the expectation of a long time horizon for interaction should stimulate the incentive to cooperate, but long time horizons may also be associated with long pasts. One way to find the answer to this puzzle is to incorporate reciprocity into more general models of international interaction.
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