When Are Sanctions Effective? A Bargaining and Enforcement Framework

Abstract

Although a considerable literature identifies the conditions under which sanctions are more likely to be successful, few studies examine the question of when sanctioning states or senders are willing to enforce their sanctions laws against their firms. Using a game theoretic model, we argue that imposing sanctions creates a strategic dilemma for senders. We demonstrate that senders often have disincentives to enforce their sanctions policies, given that the restriction on economic transactions with targeted states may undermine their firms' competitiveness. The model indicates that sanctions are more likely to succeed when the sender's firm retains a moderate share of the target's market relative to its foreign competitors. However, the model also demonstrates that sanctions are likely to be imposed only when the conditions do not favor their success. The empirical implications of the model are tested using the Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions (TIES) data set.

Can foreign aid donors credibly threaten to suspend aid? Evidence from a cross-national survey of donor officials

“…In particular, the results have potential application in the extensive debate on the effectiveness of economic sanctions (e.g. Baldwin 2000; Bapat and Kwon 2015;Drezner 2003;Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott 1990;Pape 1998;Peterson 2013). My findings suggest that scholars interested in the effectiveness of sanctions, of which aid 456 REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY suspensions are one type, need to not only pay attention to the political motives of states, but also to the institutional incentives of implementing agencies.…”

Beyond Bathsheba: Managing Ethical Climates Through Pragmatic Ethics

“…Pragmatism, as a third way, might help organizational research to be "navigated in beneficial directions while avoiding both extremes" (p. 538). Martela argues that pragmatism can add "ethicality and practical relevance into organizational research" (p. 538) which supports a utility-based bargaining perspective where pragmatism might explain the bargaining space between competing political actors (Bapat & Kwon, 2015;Lake, 2010;Walter, 2009). Farjoun, Ansell, and Boin (2015) draw upon organizational research to explore pragmatism as "the problem-solving philosophy that builds on a rich and behaviorally plausible model of human nature" (Farjoun, Ansell, & Boin, 2015, p. 1787.…”

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“…Pragmatism, as a third way, might help organizational research to be "navigated in beneficial directions while avoiding both extremes" (p. 538). Martela argues that pragmatism can add "ethicality and practical relevance into organizational research" (p. 538) which supports a utility-based bargaining perspective where pragmatism might explain the bargaining space between competing political actors (Bapat & Kwon, 2015;Lake, 2010;Walter, 2009). …”