More than 100 countries have adopted a global warming limit of 2 degrees C or below (relative to pre-industrial levels) as a guiding principle for mitigation efforts to reduce climate change risks, impacts and damages. However, the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions corresponding to a specified maximum warming are poorly known owing to uncertainties in the carbon cycle and the climate response. Here we provide a comprehensive probabilistic analysis aimed at quantifying GHG emission budgets for the 2000-50 period that would limit warming throughout the twenty-first century to below 2 degrees C, based on a combination of published distributions of climate system properties and observational constraints. We show that, for the chosen class of emission scenarios, both cumulative emissions up to 2050 and emission levels in 2050 are robust indicators of the probability that twenty-first century warming will not exceed 2 degrees C relative to pre-industrial temperatures. Limiting cumulative CO(2) emissions over 2000-50 to 1,000 Gt CO(2) yields a 25% probability of warming exceeding 2 degrees C-and a limit of 1,440 Gt CO(2) yields a 50% probability-given a representative estimate of the distribution of climate system properties. As known 2000-06 CO(2) emissions were approximately 234 Gt CO(2), less than half the proven economically recoverable oil, gas and coal reserves can still be emitted up to 2050 to achieve such a goal. Recent G8 Communiqués envisage halved global GHG emissions by 2050, for which we estimate a 12-45% probability of exceeding 2 degrees C-assuming 1990 as emission base year and a range of published climate sensitivity distributions. Emissions levels in 2020 are a less robust indicator, but for the scenarios considered, the probability of exceeding 2 degrees C rises to 53-87% if global GHG emissions are still more than 25% above 2000 levels in 2020.

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Abstract. Robust appraisals of climate impacts at different levels of global-mean temperature increase are vital to guide assessments of dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. The 2015 Paris Agreement includes a two-headed temperature goal: "holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 • C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 • C". Despite the prominence of these two temperature limits, a comprehensive overview of the differences in climate impacts at these levels is still missing. Here we provide an assessment of key impacts of climate change at warming levels of 1.5 • C and 2 • C, including extreme weather events, water availability, agricultural yields, sea-level rise and risk of coral reef loss. Our results reveal substantial differences in impacts between a 1.5 • C and 2 • C warming that are highly relevant for the assessment of dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. For heat-related extremes, the additional 0.5 • C increase in global-mean temperature marks the difference between events at the upper limit of present-day natural variability and a new climate regime, particularly in tropical regions. Similarly, this warming difference is likely to be decisive for the future of tropical coral reefs. In a scenario with an end-of-century warming of 2 • C, virtually all tropical coral reefs are projected to be at risk of severe degradation due to temperature-induced bleaching from 2050 onwards. This fraction is reduced to about 90 % in 2050 and projected to decline to 70 % by 2100 for a 1.5 • C scenario. Analyses of precipitation-related impacts reveal distinct regional differences and hot-spots of change emerge. Regional reduction in median water availability for the Mediterranean is found to nearly double from 9 % to 17 % between 1.5 • C and 2 • C, and the projected lengthening of regional dry spells increases from 7 to 11 %. Projections for agricultural yields differ between crop types as well as world regions. While some (in particular high-latitude) regions may benefit, tropical regions like West Africa, South-East Asia, as well as Central and northern South America are projected to face substantial local yield reductions, particularly for wheat and maize. Best estimate sea-level rise projections based on two illustrative scenarios indicate a 50 cm rise by 2100 relative to year 2000-levels for a 2 • C scenario, and about 10 cm lower levels for a 1.5 • C scenario. In a 1.5 • C scenario, the rate of sea-level rise in 2100 would be reduced by about 30 % compared to a 2 • C scenario. Our findings highlight the importance of regional differentiation to assess both future climate risks and different vulnerabilities to incremental increases in globalmean temperature. The article provides a consistent and comprehensive assessment of existing projections andPublished by Copernicus Publications on behalf of the European Geosciences Union. 328C.-F. Schleussner et al.: Climate impacts at 1.5 • C a...

Article 2 ͉ UNFCCC ͉ climate change impacts A rticle 2 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) commits signatory nations to stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that ''would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference (DAI) with the climate system.'' The UNFCCC also highlights 3 broad metrics with which decision-makers are to assess the pace of progress toward this goal: allow ''ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change,'' ensure that ''food production is not threatened,'' and enable ''economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.'' In an effort to provide some insight into impacts that might be considered DAI, authors of the Third Assessment Report (TAR) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) identified 5 ''reasons for concern'' (RFCs) in (1). Each RFC categorizes impacts of a similar type, providing a set of metrics reflecting severity of risk. Relationships between various impacts reflected in each RFC and increases in global mean temperature (GMT) were portrayed in what has come to be called the ''burning embers diagram''; the image was also included in the Summary for Policy Makers of the contribution of Working Group II to the TAR and highlighted in the Synthesis Report.In presenting the ''embers'' in the TAR, IPCC authors did not assess whether any single RFC was more important than any other; nor, as they noted, did they conclude what level of impact or what atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases would constitute DAI, a value judgment that would be policyprescriptive. The ''embers'' were designed primarily to communicate the associations of impacts with increases in GMT and facilitate examination of the underlying evidence for use by decision-makers contemplating responses to these concerns.The IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) states that ''the 'reasons for concern' identified in the TAR remain a viable framework for assessing key vulnerabilities'' (2). In this article, we revise sensitivities of the RFCs to increases in GMT, based on our expert judgment about new findings in the growing literature since the publication of the TAR in 2001.* Furthermore, our judgments are supported by a more thorough understanding of the concept of vulnerability that has evolved over the past 8 years, † as well as a more careful articulation of the criteria by which any specific vulnerability can be labeled ''key,'' and thus contribute to a reason for concern (3). ‡ Section 1 defines and reviews the RFCs and ''burning embers'' figure as presented in the IPCC TAR. Section 2 presents the 1 To whom correspondence may be addressed. E-mail: jsmith@stratusconsulting.com or shs@stanford.edu. *These judgments were vetted by 3 rounds of IPCC review and were approved in the Summary for Policymakers of both the AR4 Working Group 2 and Synthesis Reports by the IPCC Plenary. † Vulnerability to climate change is the degree to which geophysical, biological and socioeconomic systems are susceptible to and unable to cope with adve...

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) assessment of major risks for African agriculture and food security caused by climate change during coming decades is confirmed by a review of more recent climate change impact assessments (14 quantitative, six qualitative). Projected impacts relative to current production levels range from −100% to +168% in econometric, from −84% to +62% in process-based, and from −57% to +30% in statistical assessments. Despite large uncertainty, there are several robust conclusions from published literature for policy makers and research agendas: agriculture everywhere in Africa runs some risk to be negatively affected by climate change; existing cropping systems and infrastructure will have to change to meet future demand. With respect to growing population and the threat of negative climate change impacts, science will now have to show if and how agricultural production in Africa can be significantly improved.

In recent years, international climate policy has increasingly focused on limiting temperature rise, as opposed to achieving greenhouse-gas-concentration-related objectives. The agreements reached at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change conference in Cancun in 2010 recognize that countries should take urgent action to limit the increase in global average temperature to less than 2 • C relative to pre-industrial levels 1 . If this is to be achieved, policymakers need robust information about the amounts of future greenhouse-gas emissions that are consistent with such temperature limits. This, in turn, requires an understanding of both the technical and economic implications of reducing emissions and the processes that link emissions to temperature. Here we consider both of these aspects by reanalysing a large set of published emission scenarios from integrated assessment models in a risk-based climate modelling framework. We find that in the set of scenarios with a 'likely' (greater than 66%) chance of staying below 2 • C, emissions peak between 2010 and 2020 and fall to a median level of 44 Gt of CO 2 equivalent in 2020 (compared with estimated median emissions across the scenario set of 48 Gt of CO 2 equivalent in 2010). Our analysis confirms that if the mechanisms needed to enable an early peak in global emissions followed by steep reductions are not put in place, there is a significant risk that the 2 • C target will not be achieved.Cumulative emissions of long-lived greenhouse gases (GHGs) approximately define the temperature response of the climate system at timescales of centuries to millennia 2-4 because a significant fraction of CO 2 emissions, the dominant anthropogenic GHG, is removed very slowly from the atmosphere 5,6 . The temperature response will therefore continue, even when global emissions return to zero, or when concentrations are stabilized 6,7 . Cumulative emissions provide very little information on the technical feasibility and cost implications of following a particular 'emissions pathway', information that is needed for policymakers who are deciding now on emissions goals for the coming decades. Path-dependent assessments, such as the United Nations Environment Programme's The Emissions Gap Report 8 , are therefore highly policy-relevant. This work extends the pathway analysis of that report (see Supplementary Information).

Anthropogenic global warming is driven by emissions of a wide variety of radiative forcers ranging from very short-lived climate forcers (SLCFs), like black carbon, to very long-lived, like CO 2 . These species are often released from common sources and are therefore intricately linked. However, for reasons of simplification, this CO 2 -SLCF linkage was often disregarded in long-term projections of earlier studies. Here we explicitly account for CO 2 -SLCF linkages and show that the short-and long-term climate effects of many SLCF measures consistently become smaller in scenarios that keep warming to below 2°C relative to preindustrial levels. Although long-term mitigation of methane and hydrofluorocarbons are integral parts of 2°C scenarios, early action on these species mainly influences near-term temperatures and brings small benefits for limiting maximum warming relative to comparable reductions taking place later. Furthermore, we find that maximum 21st-century warming in 2°C-consistent scenarios is largely unaffected by additional black-carbon-related measures because key emission sources are already phased-out through CO 2 mitigation. Our study demonstrates the importance of coherently considering CO 2 -SLCF coevolutions. Failing to do so leads to strongly and consistently overestimating the effect of SLCF measures in climate stabilization scenarios. Our results reinforce that SLCF measures are to be considered complementary rather than a substitute for early and stringent CO 2 mitigation. Near-term SLCF measures do not allow for more time for CO 2 mitigation. We disentangle and resolve the distinct benefits across different species and therewith facilitate an integrated strategy for mitigating both short and long-term climate change.climate change mitigation | air pollution | short-lived climate forcers | carbon dioxide | black carbon F or about two decades, policy-makers have considered options to avoid dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system (1). So far, many countries support limiting warming to below a 2°C temperature limit, but the required global mitigation action to achieve this has been limited (2-4). To inform policy-makers about options and challenges, the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) published several reports over the past years on three interlinked aspects: climate stabilization and greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation (3), short-lived climate forcers (SLCFs) and clean-air benefits (5, 6), and hydrofluorocarbons (7) (HFCs). We build here upon the insights of these reports (henceforth referred to as "Gap Report," "SLCF Reports," and "HFC Report," respectively) to disentangle the joint effects of CO 2 and SLCF mitigation for limiting global warming. We evaluate the potential for limiting global-mean warming until 2100 and the rate of near-term warming, with a focus on 2°C-consistent scenarios (Fig. 1). Reductions in CO 2 and SLCFs also provide important cobenefits like energy security (8), and local health and agricultural benefits (9-12), which fall outside the scop...