We examine neighborhood externalities that arise from the perceived risk associated with the proximity of a registered sex offender's residence. We find large negative externality effects on a property's price and liquidity, employing empirical techniques that include a fixed-effects OLS model, a correction for sample selection bias and censoring using a Heckman treatment, and a three-stage least-squares model to account for simultaneity bias in the joint determination of a home's sale price and liquidity. Additionally, we find amplified effects for homes with more bedrooms (a proxy for children) and if the nearby offender is designated by the state as "violent."

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This study is the first to examine the principal-agent issues surrounding how agents' efforts to sell their own properties affect their efforts to sell concurrently listed client properties. The principal-agent model shows that listed agent-owned properties induce agents to worker harder over all, but diminish effort dedicated to marketing concurrently listed client properties, leading to reduced liquidity and/or lower selling prices for those properties. The empirical results show that client properties competing with agent-owned properties remain on the market 30 to 46 % longer and sell for 1.8 % less than properties whose agents have no such conflict of interest.