Based on previous research, the conceptual model presenting the interaction between transformational leadership, challenge-hindrance stressors and thriving at work was constructed and used to generate the hypotheses for the study. Data were obtained from 542 questionnaires distributed across different organizations. The participants included ordinary employees, grassroots middle and senior managers from China. The major findings are as follows. First, transformational leadership directly is positively related to challenge stressors and thriving at work. Second, challenge stressors are positively relate to thriving at work, while hindrance stressors are negatively relate to thriving at work. Furthermore, challenge stressors mediate the relationship between transformational leadership and thriving at work. Given these findings, the study examined the moderating effect of supervisor developmental feedback on the relationship between transformational leadership and thriving at work. Results reveal that supervisor developmental feedback plays a positive regulatory role between challenge stressors and thriving at work. Additionally, it is shown that the mediating effect of challenge stressors on the relationship between transformational leadership and thriving at work is moderated by supervisor developmental feedback.
This paper investigates the problem of channel choice game in two power-imbalanced supply chains consisting of the leader supply chain and the follower supply chain. We assume that there exists symmetric and asymmetric cost information between the two supply chains, and that the two chains as well as the two members in each chain follow the Stackelberg game setting. We analyse four competition scenarios: both chains are decentralised, where individual members of both supply chains maximise their own profits by independently selecting their price policies; both chains are integrated, where manufacturers and retailers coordinate their decisions to maximise supply chain profits; the leader chain is decentralised and the follower integrated; the leader is integrated and the follower decentralised. The primary objective of this paper is to investigate the influence of power imbalance, information asymmetries, and the degree of product substitutability under channel choice equilibrium. We find that, in contrast to earlier literature where all manufacturers share equal or balanced decision-making power, an integrated distribution channel is the dominant strategy for the leader under symmetric and asymmetric information Stackelberg game. As the degree of product substitutability increases, the follower will gradually switch from integrated distribution channel to decentralised distribution channel; the follower can gain from constructing a decentralised distribution channel as the prediction accuracy of the leader increases.
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