Contract choice game of supply chain competition at both manufacturer and retailer levels

Li, Baixun; Zhou, Yong‐Wu; Li, Jizi; Zhou, Sizhong

doi:10.1016/j.ijpe.2013.01.007

Cited by 34 publications

(18 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…Li et al. () present and compare the results of the wholesale price and quantity discount contracts under different scenarios, to explore the impacts of supply chain structure and competition at both manufacturer and retailer levels on the profits and contract choices of two supply chains. Wang and Shin () consider a supply chain consisting of a supplier who invests in innovation and a manufacturer.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Cachon and Kök (2010) consider a supply chain where the manufacturers compete for the retailer's business using one of three contract types, that is, a wholesale price contract, a quantity discount contract, or a two-part tariff. Li et al (2013) present and compare the results of the wholesale price and quantity discount contracts under different scenarios, to explore the impacts of supply chain structure and competition at both manufacturer and retailer levels on the profits and contract choices of two supply chains. Wang and Shin (2015) consider a supply chain consisting of a supplier who invests in innovation and a manufacturer.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Wholesale price contract versus consignment contract in a supply chain considering dynamic advertising

Zhang

2017

Int Trans Operational Res

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Supply chain contracts are widely considered as useful and necessary tools to guide and restrict channel members' behaviors. Considering the effect of dynamic advertising, we investigate two distinct types of contracts between a dominant retailer and her manufacturer. One contract is a traditional wholesale price contract and the other is a consignment contract. The results show that, compared to the wholesale price contract, the consignment contract is always more desirable from the perspectives of the retailer and the entire channel and brings more consumer surplus. When the dominant retailer's advertising effort is very effective or channel members have enough patience, the dominant retailer and the manufacturer can achieve a Pareto improvement under the consignment contract; otherwise the manufacturer prefers the wholesale price contract.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Wholesale price contract versus consignment contract in a supply chain considering dynamic advertising

Zhang

2017

Int Trans Operational Res

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“…Our paper is most closely related to Cachon and Kök [9], Pan et al [8], Feng and Lu [7], and Li et al [29]. We extend their models in two dimensions.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 70%

“…They derive the outcomes of Stackelberg games via generalized Nash bargaining scheme. Li et al [29] explore the effect of supply chain structure and competition at both manufacturer and retailer levels on contract choices of two competing supply chains.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Contract Strategies in Competing Supply Chains with Risk-Averse Suppliers

Zhou

Niu

2013

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

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This paper investigates the equilibrium contract strategies of two competing supply chains. Each chain is composed of one riskaverse supplier and one risk-neutral retailer. The two suppliers, as Stackelberg leaders, can choose either wholesale price or revenue sharing contract. We compare the outcomes obtained from different scenarios and study the impact of competition density and risk attitudes on the suppliers' contract choices. We find that it is always optimal for the first-moving supplier to choose revenue sharing contract if the follower chooses wholesale price contract. We also find that the retail price under revenue sharing contract is lower than that under wholesale price contract. Compared to Pan et al. (2010), we find that a threshold policy with respect to the degree of product substitutability holds in a sequential competition environment. There also exists a threshold policy with respect to the degree of risk aversion for the suppliers to choose their individual contract types and the corresponding chain-to-chain contract strategies.

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“…Also in SC competition literature, there are three kinds of competitions: horizontal competition: competition between firms of one tier of a SC (Nagurney et al 2002;Dong et al 2004;Cruz 2008;Zhang and Zhou 2012;Qiang et al 2013;Huseh 2015;Qiang 2015;Nagurney 2016, Nagurney et al 2016); vertical competition: competition between the firms of different tiers of a SC (Bernstein and Federgruen 2005;Anderson and Bao 2000;Chen et al 2013, Wu 2013Zhao and Wang 2015;Zhang et al 2015;Bai et al 2016;Bo and Li 2016;Esmaeilzadeh and Taleizadeh 2016;Huang et al 2016;Wang et al 2017;Genc and Giovanni 2017;Chaeb and Rasti-Barzoki 2016); and SC versus SC: competition between SCs (Boyaci and Gallego 2004;Xiao and Yang 2008;Zhang 2006;Li et al 2013;Chung and Kwon 2016). Ezimadu and Nwozo (2017) used Sethi model to models the dynamic effect of the manufacturer and retailer's advertising efforts on sale and by the help of control technique and stochastic differential game theory the players' advertising strategies and the long-run value of the awareness share are obtained.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Decentralized supply chain network design: monopoly, duopoly and oligopoly competitions under uncertainty

2017

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This paper presents the competitive supply chain network design problem in which n decentralized supply chains simultaneously enter the market with no existing rival chain, shape their networks and set wholesale and retail prices in competitive mode. The customer demand is elastic and price dependent, customer utility function is based on the Hoteling model and the chains produce identical or highly substitutable products. We construct a solution algorithm based on bi-level programming and possibility theory. In the proposed bi-level model, the inner part sets the prices based on simultaneous extra-and Stackleberg intra-chains competitions, and the outer part shapes the networks in cooperative competitions. Finally, we use a real-word study to discuss the effect of the different structures of the competitors on the equilibrium solution. Moreover, sensitivity analyses are conducted and managerial insights are offered.

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Contract choice game of supply chain competition at both manufacturer and retailer levels

Cited by 34 publications

References 23 publications

Wholesale price contract versus consignment contract in a supply chain considering dynamic advertising

Wholesale price contract versus consignment contract in a supply chain considering dynamic advertising

Contract Strategies in Competing Supply Chains with Risk-Averse Suppliers

Decentralized supply chain network design: monopoly, duopoly and oligopoly competitions under uncertainty

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