Rising shareholder activism following poor corporate performance and a subsequent drop in shareholder value at many major U.S. corporations had rekindled interest in duality and corporate governance. Despite limited empirical evidence, duality (chairman of the board and CEO are the same individual) has been blamed, in many cases, for the poor performance, and failure of firms to adapt to a changing environment. In examining the relationship between duality and firm performance, this study considers the announcement effects of changes in duality status, accounting measures of operating performance for firms that have changed their duality structure, and long‐term measures of performance for firms that have had a consistent history of a duality structure. Our results suggest that: (1) the market is indifferent to changes in a firm's duality status; (2) there is little evidence of operating performance changes around changes in duality status; and (3) there is only weak evidence that duality status affects long‐term performance, after controlling for other factors that might impact that performance.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. Abstract. The paper has 2 major objectives: first, to identify control and delegation issues confronting multinational corporation managers; second, to develop a conceptual model to assist multinational corporation managers in selecting appropriate control systems and determining the extent of delegation to be provided to subsidiary managers. Finally, the paper suggests directions for future research. , are utilized along with control and decision-making systems to integrate the various units. An understanding of these is, therefore, of crucial importance to all managers, particularly the multinational corporation managers for whom these problems are more acute. This paper will first examine the concept of control and decision making in the context of multinational corporations. Subsequent sections will consider some specific contingencies that affect control and decision making. Finally, a model will be developed to assist multinational corporation managers in selecting systems of control and decision making.

A model of cultural control is developed and contrasted with the more familiar bureaucratic control model. This model is used to explain processes of strategic adaptation as observed in Japanese cultural control and American bureaucratic control firms. A discussion of the strategic costs and benefits to the organization associated with each type of control is then presented.

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