JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. Abstract. The paper has 2 major objectives: first, to identify control and delegation issues confronting multinational corporation managers; second, to develop a conceptual model to assist multinational corporation managers in selecting appropriate control systems and determining the extent of delegation to be provided to subsidiary managers. Finally, the paper suggests directions for future research. , are utilized along with control and decision-making systems to integrate the various units. An understanding of these is, therefore, of crucial importance to all managers, particularly the multinational corporation managers for whom these problems are more acute. This paper will first examine the concept of control and decision making in the context of multinational corporations. Subsequent sections will consider some specific contingencies that affect control and decision making. Finally, a model will be developed to assist multinational corporation managers in selecting systems of control and decision making.

SummaryThis study expands the negotiation literature by examining how negotiator behavior is predicted by various emotions felt by the negotiators and their counterparts and by counterpart negotiation behavior. Using hierarchical linear modeling, we also compare individual-and dyad-level processes that lead to negotiator behavior and outcomes. The results from a dyadic negotiation simulation showed that both the valence and agency of negotiator and counterpart emotions need to be considered to understand the roles of emotion in negotiator behavior. Negotiators tend to reciprocate counterparts' integrating, compromising, and dominating behaviors, but they also offer complementary (or matching) responses to the counterparts' dominating and yielding behaviors. Integrating behavior was more dependent on dyad-level interpersonal dynamics than were the other behaviors. The comparison of negotiator-level and dyad-level results suggests that negotiation needs to be understood in the context of collective exchanges as well as individual-level cognitive processes.

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A model of cultural control is developed and contrasted with the more familiar bureaucratic control model. This model is used to explain processes of strategic adaptation as observed in Japanese cultural control and American bureaucratic control firms. A discussion of the strategic costs and benefits to the organization associated with each type of control is then presented.