This paper incorporates costly voluntary acquisition of information à la Nikitin and Smith (2007) (2000) [Allen, F., Gale, D., 2000. Financial contagion. Journal of Political Economy 108, 1 33], without relying on any unexpected shock to model contagion. In this framework, contagion and financial crises are the result of information gathering by depositors, weak fundamentals and an incomplete market structure of banks. It also shows how financial systems entering a recession can affect others with apparently stronger economic conditions (contagion). Finally, this is the first paper to investigate the effectiveness of the Contingent Credit Line procedures, introduced by the IMF at the end of the nineties, as a mechanism to prevent the propagation of crises. Ó JEL classification: G21; D82

The recent financial crisis has focused the attention of scholars and policymakers on how to improve financial stability through better macro‐prudential regulation and supervision. In this paper, we compare the existing theoretical and empirical literature on contagion through the banking system. It is argued that the structure of the interbank market, the size of banks, the linkages among them, the level of correlation of their investments and the transparency of the regulator are key factors in determining the possibility of contagion. We discuss the different findings and present avenues for future research.

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The aim of this paper is twofold: First to test the adequacy of Pareto distributions to describe the tail of financial returns in emerging and developed markets, and second to study the possible correlation between stock market indices observed returns and return's extreme distributional characteristics measured by Value at Risk and Expected Shortfall.We test the empirical model using daily data from 41 countries, in the period from 1995 to 2005. The findings support the adequacy of Pareto distributions and the use of a log linear regression estimation of their parameters, as an alternative for the usually employed Hill's estimator. We also report a significant relationship between extreme distributional characteristics and observed returns, especially for developed countries.

a b s t r a c tThis paper analyzes the effectiveness of different government policies to prevent the emergence of bank ing crises. In particular, we study the impact on welfare of using taxpayers money to recapitalize banks, government injection of money into the banking system through credit lines, the creation of a buffer and taxes on financial transactions (the Tobin tax). We illustrate the trade off between these policies and derive policy implications.