ASCT constitutes a therapeutic option for HL patients after a first relapse. Promising results are observed in patients with low tumour burden at diagnosis, autografted after a long CR and without detectable disease at ASCT. Innovative approaches should be pursued for patients with risk factors at relapse.

ASCT achieves long-term disease-free survival in HD patients. Disease status before ASCT is the most important prognostic factor for final outcome; thus, transplantation should be considered in early stages of the disease. TBI must be avoided in the conditioning regimen because of a significantly higher rate of late complications, including secondary malignancies.

This paper considers cost-reducing R&D investment with spillovers in a Cournot oligopoly with overlapping ownership. We show that overlapping ownership leads to internalization of rivals. profits by firms and find that, for demand not too convex, increases in overlapping ownership increase (decrease) R&D and output for high (low) enough spillovers while it increases R&D but decreases output for intermediate levels of spillovers. There is scope for overlapping ownership to improve welfare provided that spillovers are sufficiently large. The socially optimal degree of overlapping ownership increases with the number of firms, with the elasticity of demand and of the innovation function, and with the extent of spillover effects. In terms of consumer surplus standard, the desirability of overlapping ownership is greatly reduced even under low market concentration. When R&D has commitment value and spillovers are high the optimal extent of overlapping ownership is higher. The results obtained are robust in the context of a Bertrand oligopoly model with product differentiation.

We re-examine the literature on mobile termination in the presence of network externalities. Externalities arise when firms discriminate between on-and off-net calls or when subscription demand is elastic. This literature predicts that profit decreases and consumer surplus increases in termination charge in a neighborhood of termination cost. This creates a puzzle since in reality we see regulators worldwide pushing termination rates down while being opposed by network operators. We show that this puzzle is resolved when consumers' expectations are assumed passive but required to be fulfilled in equilibrium (as defined by Katz and Shapiro, AER 1985), instead of being rationally responsive to non-equilibrium prices, as assumed until now.