Manuscript Type: Empirical Research Questions/Issue: This paper seeks to explore the interrelationships between corporate governance (CG) and corporate social responsibility (CSR): first, theoretically, by reviewing the literature and surveying various postulations on offer; second, empirically, by investigating the conception and interpretation of this relationship in the context of a sample of firms operating in Lebanon. Accordingly, the paper seeks to highlight the increasing cross-connects or interfaces between CG and CSR, capitalizing on fresh insights from a developing country perspective. Research Findings/Results: A qualitative interpretive research methodology was adopted, drawing on in-depth interviews with the top managers of eight corporations operating in Lebanon, with the findings suggesting that the majority of managers conceive of CG as a necessary pillar for sustainable CSR. These findings are significant and interesting, implying that recent preoccupation with CG in developing countries is starting to be counterbalanced by some interest/attention to CSR, with growing appreciation of their interdependencies and the need to move beyond CG conformance toward voluntary CSR performance. Theoretical Implications: This study makes two important contributions. First, it suggests that there is a salient two-way relationship and increasing overlap between CG and CSR. While much previous literature has researched CG and CSR independently, this paper makes the case for considering them jointly and systematically. Second, the paper outlines a number of theoretical propositions that can serve as the basis for future research on the topic, particularly in developing countries, given that the data and theoretical propositions are both derived from and tailored to developing country contexts. Practical Implications: This study can potentially alert managers to the increasing overlap between the CG and CSR agendas and the need to exert diligent systematic efforts on both fronts. CG and CSR share more in common than previously assumed, and this needs to be accounted for by practitioners. The research can also alert policy makers in developing countries to the need to increase the vigilance and capacity of the regulatory and judicial systems in the context of CG reform and to increase institutional pressures, particularly of the coercive and normative variety to enhance CSR adoption.

Manuscript Type: EmpiricalResearch Question/Issue: This paper takes a theory building approach to highlighting variations of agency theory in the unique and complex context of Islamic banks, mainly stemming from the need to comply with Sharia and the separation of cash flow and control rights for a category of investors. Research Findings/Results: The paper provides insights that agency structures in the context of Islamic banking might give rise to trade-offs between Sharia compliance and mechanisms protecting investors' rights. Alternative models of idiosyncratic governance might be effective in balancing the two cornerstones of the agency dynamic. In practice, the paper finds that most of the surveyed Islamic banks appear to recognize the value of governance and institute some basic mechanisms. Nonetheless, some governance flaws relating to audit, control, and transparency are observed, a situation further exacerbated by the fact that investment account holders are not represented on the board, and are not granted control or monitoring rights. This leads to a discussion on the tradeoff between the costs and benefits of such a practice. Theoretical Implications: This study contributes to the agency theory literature by providing theoretical propositions highlighting challenges to this theory whereby mechanisms with the purpose of mitigating agency problems might lead to a divergence from Islamic principles of Sharia. Practical Implications: The paper motivates Islamic banks to improve governance practices currently in place. It alerts policy makers to the need to tailor the regulations to safeguard the interests of all investors without violating the principles of Sharia.

Purpose -The ascendancy of women to top management positions is a perennial problem plaguing organizations worldwide. The purpose of this paper is to present some insights relating to this pervasive phenomenon from a Middle Eastern context by exploring the constraints reported by Lebanese women managers throughout their careers. Design/methodology/approach -Literature review and qualitative research methodology consisting of interviews with 62 Lebanese women managers in different fields of occupation. Findings -The findings suggest that the constraints reported by Lebanese women managers are similar to those reported worldwide. The main differences revolve around the strongly felt salience of cultural values and expectations constraining women to traditional roles and a more accentuated sense of patriarchy. Originality/value -The value added of this research is to present an insider view and fresh perspective into career constraints facing women from a non-traditional context, namely Lebanon. In view of the Western-centric nature of academic publication on the topic, there is a real need and added value in empirical research stemming from an Arab-Middle Eastern context.

This paper finds that, on average, targets that terminate takeover offers significantly increase their leverage ratios. Targets that increase their leverage ratios the most reduce capital expenditures, sell assets, reduce employment, increase focus, and realize cash f lows and share prices that outperform their benchmarks in the five years following the failed takeover. Our evidence suggests that leverageincreasing targets act in the interests of shareholders when they terminate takeover offers and that higher leverage helps firms remain independent not because it entrenches managers, but because it commits managers to making the improvements that would be made by potential raiders. THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROL was quite active and controversial in the 1980s. Although there were many successful takeovers, there were also many takeover attempts that failed. Consequently, an analysis of the behavior of firms that successfully resist takeover attempts is needed to fully understand the economic effects of corporate control activity. In this paper, we investigate this issue by examining a sample of 573 unsuccessful takeover attempts during the 1982 to 1991 period.In many of the failed takeovers, the target's management expressed the opinion that the acquirer's offer was insufficient and that the firm would be worth more if it remained independent. For example, 47 targets in our sample explicitly announced that they were rejecting offers because "the price is too low or inadequate." In response to these 47 announcements, target stock prices declined 3.42 percent on average. Whatever the stated reason, it is clear that investors are generally skeptical when target managers terminate a takeover attempt. In our entire sample, target stock prices decline 5.14 percent, on average, around the date of the termination announcement. an anonymous referee for helpful suggestions on earlier drafts. We are particularly indebted to Edith Hotchkiss and William Wilhelm for insightful comments and suggestions. Earlier drafts of the paper were circulated under the title "Debt and Corporate Performance: Evidence from Unsuccessful Takeovers." THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE • VOL. LIV, NO. 2 • APRIL 1999 547 It is often said that "talk is cheap" and that "actions speak louder than words." However, in many cases, target managers combine their cheap talk with meaningful actions. In particular, many of the targets of failed takeovers substantially increased their leverage ratios, which can be viewed as either a signal~e.g., Ross~1977!! or a commitment~e.g., Grossman and Hart 1982! or Jensen~1986!! that the promised improvements would in fact take place. In our sample of 328 targets of failed takeovers with adequate data, 207 increased their leverage ratios. The median level of total debt scaled by the book value of assets of these firms increased from 59.8 percent one year before the unsuccessful takeover attempt to 71.5 percent one year afterward. 1 These leverage increases appear to be part of the targets' defensive strategies. Targets of ...

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