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We present a new dataset enumerating the population of organizations listed and/or registered as lobbyists in the EU. In the first part of the paper we describe how we arrived at the population dataset by drawing on three independent sources (Coneccs; Landmarks; EP registry). We briefly discuss the validity of these registers in the context of recent substantial changes in each of them. In the second part, we present descriptive information on the number and type of groups as well as their territorial origins. In the last part, we outline potential research questions that can be addressed with the new dataset. This includes a description of our use of this new interest group sampling frame, combined with internet research, to arrive at a random sample of issues to be used as the basis for further research on the role of groups in the EU policy process.

A considerable number of theories such as neo-functionalism and neo-institutionalism consider the European Commission a central actor in European Union (EU) politics. Yet, our theoretical understanding of the Commission is still limited. By taking recourse to principal -agent theory, this article argues that the European Commission should be considered neither a technocratic nor an overly independent actor in EU politics. The paper's theoretical focus is on member states' incentives to nominate and appoint particular types of European Commissioners and its likely effects on the Commission's policy preferences. The dataset used to test the theoretical claims was generated by the author for this purpose. It contains the theoretically relevant information on all European Commissioners appointed between 1958 and the present (N ¼ 215) as well as relevant attributes of the nominating governments. I suggest that the Commission should be considered a political rather than a technocratic actor with close political ties to EU member states.

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