Introduction: agency governance in the European Union

Rittberger, Berthold; Wonka, Arndt

doi:10.1080/13501763.2011.593356

Cited by 64 publications

(47 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…Once an agency is created, its actual autonomy might change over time: Reflecting neo-institutional thought, the autonomy of expert bodies is shaped by-but not limited to the effects of-legal and organisational factors (Rittberger & Wonka, 2011). Despite the illustrated importance of reputation-building and institutionalisation (Carpenter, 2001;Groenleer, 2009), however, we lack systematic insights on the actual policy autonomy of ERAs (Egeberg & Trondal, 2011).…”

Section: Regulation By Information: Autonomy and Expertise Of Erasmentioning

confidence: 99%

Driven by Expertise and Insulation? The Autonomy of European Regulatory Agencies

Ossege¹

2015

PaG

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Expertise and autonomy are cornerstones to the effective operation and legitimacy of European Regulatory Agencies (ERAs). Yet, we know little about ERAs' actual autonomy, nor about factors shaping it. This article studies ERAs' actual autonomy from public and private actors, emphasising two crucial explanatory factors: expertise and rulemaking competences. The lack of insights on expertise is particularly striking, as expertise-the "raison d'être" and main resource of expert bodies-provides ERAs with a potentially powerful means to increase autonomy. Relying on a rational institutionalist framework within which ERAs enjoy substantive discretion to pursue their goals, the study empirically compares three powerful ERAs-the European Medicines Agency, the European Chemicals Agency, and the European Food Safety Authority. Based on the analysis of 39 semi-structured expert interviews, findings show that expertise is a crucial explanation for ERAs' substantive autonomy from the Commission. Towards research intensive private stakeholders, the role of expertise becomes less pronounced. Instead, ERAs are more successful in protecting their autonomy by engaging in the risk-averse interpretation of the regulatory framework and by adapting rules over time to adapt their needs: they engage in "procedural insulation". Political salience provides a scope condition for ERAs to use expert knowledge and rulemaking competences more strategically-potentially undermining scientific quality.

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Section: Regulation By Information: Autonomy and Expertise Of Erasmentioning

confidence: 99%

Driven by Expertise and Insulation? The Autonomy of European Regulatory Agencies

Ossege¹

2015

PaG

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“…Despite the nature of co-ordination as one of the key limits of administration (Hood 1976:17ff) and pervasive problems of government (Wilson [1989] 2000: 268f), governance of interdependence in the European Union (EU) rests on co-ordination to a large extent: Coordination between regulators has become the key mechanism for managing cross-border risks and regulating integrated markets as national regulators come together in EU regulatory bodies -such as offices and agencies-to coordinate their practices (Dehousse 1997;Eberlein and Grande 2005;Eberlein and Newman 2008;Levi-Faur 2011;Majone 1997;Rittberger and Wonka 2011;Sabel and Zeitlin 2008;Slaughter 2004;). In facilitating horizontal and vertical co-ordination of regulatory practices, such EU regulatory bodies can -at least in theory-counteract the mismatch between the regulatory responsibilities and the miniscule administrative capacity of the EU (Eberlein and Newman 2008: 25;Majone 2000: 279).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Regulatory co-ordination in the EU: a cross-sector comparison

Heims

2016

Journal of European Public Policy

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The paper examines what drives national regulators' attitudes towards and engagement with EU regulatory co-ordination as facilitated by EU agencies and offices. It suggests that a bureaucratic politics perspective can counteract shortcomings of explanations conventionally advanced in the EU governance literature by showing that national regulators' attitudes towards co-ordination are driven by the aim to protect their turf. This is empirically demonstrated by a comparison of attitudes to co-ordination across maritime safety and food control authorities in the UK and Germany that draws on original document analysis and semi-structured interviews with British, German and EU officials. UK and German food control authorities have a positive attitude towards EU co-ordination, but the maritime safety authorities contest it. While the food control authorities use EU co-ordination to enhance their bureaucratic turf vis-à-vis lower-level authorities, the maritime safety authorities perceive EU coordination to threaten their established position in the International Maritime Organization.

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“…With the increasing "agencification" of policy making, normative questions regarding the legitimacy of EU agencies have become ever more important (see Rittberger & Wonka, 2011). This is particularly the case with regulatory agencies which are de facto decision makers without having de jure decision making powers (Gehring & Krapohl, 2007;Klika, Kim, & Versluis, 2013;Krapohl, 2004).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Implementation of the REACH Authorisation Procedure on Chemical Substances of Concern: What Kind of Legitimacy?

Klika

2015

PaG

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With the increasing "agencification" of policy making in the European Union (EU), normative questions regarding the legitimacy of EU agencies have become ever more important. This article analyses the role of expertise and legitimacy with regard to the European Chemicals Agency ECHA. Based on the REACH regulation, so-called Substances of Very High Concern (SVHCs) are subject to authorisation. The authorisation procedure aims to ensure the good functioning of the internal market, while assuring that risks of SVHCs are properly controlled. Since ECHA has become operational in 2008, recurring decisions on SVHCs have been made. The question posed in this article is: to what extent can decision making in the REACH authorisation procedure be assessed as legitimate? By drawing on the notion of throughput legitimacy, this article argues that decision making processes in the authorisation procedure are characterized by insufficient legitimacy.

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Introduction: agency governance in the European Union

Cited by 64 publications

References 23 publications

Driven by Expertise and Insulation? The Autonomy of European Regulatory Agencies

Driven by Expertise and Insulation? The Autonomy of European Regulatory Agencies

Regulatory co-ordination in the EU: a cross-sector comparison

The Implementation of the REACH Authorisation Procedure on Chemical Substances of Concern: What Kind of Legitimacy?

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