A B S T R A C TNumerous scholarly articles have investigated member states' a priori voting power in past, present and possible future Councils of the European Union (EU). This article introduces three empirically oriented variants of the standardized Banzhaf index and compares them with the standardized Banzhaf index itself. The comparison suggests that the averages of the empirically oriented indices converge towards the Banzhaf index, and hence that there is no dominant ordering of the member states or the issues and, consequently, no stable minimal winning coalitions over time. However, statistical analysis reveals that the country-bycountry average difference from the Banzhaf index, considering all issues, remains significant in all three variants of empirical power. 3

We present a study of the network of relationships among elected members of the Finnish parliament, based on a quantitative analysis of initiative co-signatures, and its evolution over 16 years. To understand the structure of the parliament, we constructed a statistically validated network of members, based on the similarity between the patterns of initiatives they signed. We looked for communities within the network and characterized them in terms of members' attributes, such as electoral district and party. To gain insight on the nested structure of communities, we constructed a hierarchical tree of members from the correlation matrix. Afterwards, we studied parliament dynamics yearly, with a focus on correlations within and between parties, by also distinguishing between government and opposition. Finally, we investigated the role played by specific individuals, at a local level. In particular, whether they act as proponents who gather consensus, or as signers. Our results provide a quantitative background to current theories in political science. From a methodological point of view, our network approach has proven able to highlight both local and global features of a complex social system.

This article examines the degree to which sponsored private member's bills (PMBs) in parliament can be explained by electoral incentives. Such bills are a peculiar piece of draft legislation -technically simple, topically unimportant and with negligible passage rates. Yet members of parliament (MPs) sponsor them in large numbers. One possible explanation for this behaviour is the electoral context arising out of the variance in electoral district size and electoral list types, which makes a strong personal reputation comparatively more important for some MPs. Sponsoring bills that have no realistic chance of becoming actual regulations could be a form of personal reputation-building and/or vote-seeking behaviour. Evidence is examined on the sponsoring of such bills in Finland between 2003 and in Estonia between 1999 in order to determine if the electoral context explains why some MPs do this more frequently. The results suggest that the electoral system does have an effect. MPs who have been elected under rules where personal reputation is not central in getting elected are less likely to sponsor such bills the larger their electoral district becomes.

Members’ of Parliament (MP) private motions in the Finnish parliament Eduskunta are explored. During 1999–2010, the Finnish MPs introduced nearly 20,000 motions, from which 75% turned out to be budget amendments while legislative motions constituted some 10%. Roughly half were single signer motions while the rest were sponsored by various MP combinations. Only few motions were processed in committees and even fewer got accepted. A growing amount of party motions sponsored by one party group were found. Motions sponsored by MPs from the same electoral district were found as well. A handful of motions sponsored by the absolute majority of Eduskunta were also found. Comparing the sponsor networks with the Swedish parliament, where the MPs tend to cooperate with their group comrades, reveals the Finnish MPs cooperating significantly more often over the party lines. While analyses of plenary voting primarily divide the Finnish MPs into government and opposition blocs the analysis of private motions results in a completely different pattern of cooperation. In Eduskunta matters are initiated somewhat freely while at the stage of decision party discipline steps in.

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