We elaborate a cultural framing theory of legal cynicism -previously used to account for neighborhood variation in Chicago homicides -to explain Arab Sunni victimization and insurgent attacks during the U.S. post-invasion occupation of Iraq. Legal cynicism theory has an unrecognized power to explain collective and interpersonal violence in international as well as American settings. We expand on how "double and linked" roles of state and non-state actors can be used in this theory to analyze violence against Arab Sunni civilians. Arab Sunnis responded to their reports of unnecessary violent attacks by U.S./Coalition soldiers with a legally cynical framing of the U.S./Coalition-led invasion and occupation, the new Shia-dominated Iraq state, and its military and police. A post-invasion frame amplification of beliefs about state-based illegitimacy, unresponsiveness, and insecurity made it not only possible but predictable that Arab Sunni insurgent attacks would continue against U.S./Coalition forces and transfer to Shiadominated Iraq government forces. Violence in Iraq persisted despite Surge efforts to end the Arab Sunni insurgency.
We use two unique Iraq data sets to show how fear and uncertainty served to motivate the self-fulfilling, neighborhood-specific forces that followed the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. Sectarian criminal violence by armed Shia and Sunni organizations created a situation of ethnic/religious cleansing that reconfigured much of Baghdad. The article focuses on the case of how one particularly violent group, the Mahdi Army, mobilized through the coercive entrepreneurship of Muqtada al-Sadr, used organized crime tactics of killing, torture, rape, kidnapping, harassment, threats, and forced displacement in a widespread and systematic attack against civilians that forced Sunni residents from their Baghdad neighborhoods. Ordinary Iraqis were victims of an amplified "self-fulfilling prophecy of fear" that created the momentum for massive sectarian displacement in the battle for Baghdad. We demonstrate that there is a neighborhood specific effect of early postinvasion neighborhood fear net of intervening violence on displacement three years later, following the Al-Qaeda Samara Shrine attack, confirming an effect of a self-fulfilling prophecy of fear in the neighborhoods of Baghdad that compounded in a self-reinforcing way. The changed demography of Baghdad was effectively consolidated by the later surge of U.S. forces that left in place the territorial gains made by the Shia-led Mahdi Army at the expense of former Sunni residents. We conclude that this continues to matter because the resulting grievances have contributed to renewed violence.
Economic conflict crimes are defined in this paper as violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, as well as domestic law, associated with military and political conflict and producing significant monetary as well as other forms of suffering for civilians. Criminologists are well positioned by disciplinary emphasis to document and explain military and political violence resulting in economic conflict crimes. Criminal victimization associated with the US-led invasion of Iraq imposed an enormous toll on civilians. Yet there is little attention by criminologists or others to the profound economic costs to Iraqis, whether through lost property, life, or opportunities. We cautiously estimate that the economic losses for households in the city of Baghdad alone were almost US$100 billion, and more than three times this amount for the entire country, with Sunni groups experiencing significantly greater losses than others. So far as we know, our article presents the first estimates of civilian losses from economic conflict crimes that followed the US-led invasion of Iraq. These losses were widespread and systematic, the hallmarks of crimes against humanity.
From the torture of detainees at Abu Ghraib to unnecessary military attacks on civilians, this book is an account of the violations of international criminal law committed during the United States invasion of Iraq. Taking stock of the entire war, it uniquely documents the overestimation of the successes and underestimation of the failings of the Surge and Awakening policies. The authors show how an initial cynical framing of the American war led to the creation of a new Shia-dominated Iraq state, which in turn provoked powerful feelings of legal cynicism among Iraqis, especially the Sunni. The predictable result was a resilient Sunni insurgency that re-emerged in the violent aftermath of the 2011 withdrawal. Examining more than a decade of evidence, this book makes a powerful case that the American war in Iraq constituted a criminal war of aggression.
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