The theory of probabilistic mental models (PMM; G. Gigerenzer, U. Hoffrage, & H. Kleinbölting, 1991) has had a major influence on the field of judgment and decision making, with the most recent important modifications to PMM theory being the identification of several fast and frugal heuristics (G. Gigerenzer & D. G. Goldstein, 1996). These heuristics were purported to provide psychologically plausible cognitive process models that describe a variety of judgment behavior. In this article, the authors evaluate the psychological plausibility of the assumptions upon which PMM were built and, consequently, the psychological plausibility of several of the fast and frugal heuristics. The authors argue that many of PMM theory's assumptions are questionable, given available data, and that fast and frugal heuristics are, in fact, psychologically implausible.

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We put forth a theoretical unification of 2 of the more popular theories of job stress: challenge-hindrance and the soeiocognitive models of stress, to explain the process by which stress impacts performance. In Study 1, we manipulated challenge fn = 98) and hindrance stress (n = 96) and measured its effect on perceived stress, on-task effort, negative affective thoughts, and decision-making performance. The relationship between perceived stress and performance was fully mediated by on-task effort and negative affective thoughts. In Study 2, we manipulated Stressor strength by randomly assigning participants to a pervasive time pressure (n = 48) or no time pressure fn = 47) condition. Compared with the no time pressure condition, the pervasive time pressure significantly reduced performance and increased perceived stress. Across the 2 studies, we identified a boundary condition of the

Previous research by J. M. Hinson, T. L. Jameson, and P. Whitney (2003) demonstrated that a secondary task in a delayed discounting paradigm increased subjects' preference for the immediate reward. J. M. Hinson et al. interpreted their findings as evidence that working memory load results in greater impulsivity. The present authors conducted a reanalysis of the data from J. M. Hinson et al.'s Experiment 1 at the individual-subject level. Difference scores were calculated by subtracting the digit memory load condition from the control condition for k (discounting parameter) and a measure of "erroneous" responses. The results indicated that the secondary task increased random responding, which in turn can account for the increased mean estimates of k. Thus, the data do not support the claim that cognitive load affects impulsivity per se.