People often have trouble performing 2 relatively simple tasks concurrently. The causes of this interference and its implications for the nature of attentional limitations have been controversial for 40 years, but recent experimental findings are beginning to provide some answers. Studies of the psychological refractory period effect indicate a stubborn bottleneck encompassing the process of choosing actions and probably memory retrieval generally, together with certain other cognitive operations. Other limitations associated with task preparation, sensory-perceptual processes, and timing can generate additional and distinct forms of interference. These conclusions challenge widely accepted ideas about attentional resources and probe reaction time methodologies. They also suggest new ways of thinking about continuous dual-task performance, effects of extraneous stimulation (e.g., stop signals), and automaticity. Implications for higher mental processes are discussed.

The authors performed a meta-analysis of the distributed practice effect to illuminate the effects of temporal variables that have been neglected in previous reviews. This review found 839 assessments of distributed practice in 317 experiments located in 184 articles. Effects of spacing (consecutive massed presentations vs. spaced learning episodes) and lag (less spaced vs. more spaced learning episodes) were examined, as were expanding interstudy interval (ISI) effects. Analyses suggest that ISI and retention interval operate jointly to affect final-test retention; specifically, the ISI producing maximal retention increased as retention interval increased. Areas needing future research and theoretical implications are discussed.

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Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studiesofemotion, personality, and social cognition have drawn much attention in recent years, with high-profile studies frequently reporting extremely high (e.g., >.8) correlations between brain activation and personality measures. We show that these correlations are higher than should be expected given the (evidently limited) reliability of both fMRI and personality measures. The high correlations are all the more puzzling because method sections rarely contain much detail about how the correlations were obtained. We surveyed authors of 55 articles that reported findings of this kind to determine a few details on how these correlations were computed. More than half acknowledged using a strategy that computes separate correlations for individual voxels and reports means of only those voxels exceeding chosen thresholds. We show how this nonindependent analysis inflates correlations while yielding reassuring-looking scattergrams. This analysis technique was used to obtain the vast majority of the implausibly high correlations in our survey sample. In addition, we argue that, in some cases, other analysis problems likely created entirely spurious correlations. We outline how the data from these studies could be reanalyzed with unbiased methods to provide accurate estimates of the correlations in question and urge authors to perform such reanalyses. The underlying problems described here appear to be common in fMRI research of many kinds—not just in studies of emotion, personality, and social cognition.

The cognitive processes underlying event-based prospective memory in school age children and young adults: A formal model-based study.

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When the stimuli from two tasks arrive in rapid succession (the overlapping tasks paradigm), response delays are typically observed. Two general types of models have been proposed to account for these delays. Postponement models suppose that processing stages in the second task are delayed due to a single-channel bottleneck. Capacity-sharing models suppose that processing on both tasks occurs at reduced rates because of sharing of common resources. Postponement models make strong and distinctive predictions for the behaviour of variables slowing particular second-task stages, when assessed in single- and dual-task conditions. In Experiment 1, subjects were required to make manual classification responses to a tone (S1) and a letter (S2), presented at stimulus onset asynchronies of 50, 100, and 400 msec, making R1 responses to S1 as promptly as possible. The second response, R2, but not R1, was delayed in the dual task condition, and the effects of two S2 variables (degradation and repetition) on R2 response times in dual- and single-task conditions closely matched the predictions of a postponement model with a processing bottleneck at the decision/response-selection stage. In Experiment 2, subjects were encouraged to emit both responses close together in time. Use of this response grouping procedure had little effect on the magnitude of R2 response times, or on the pattern of stimulus factor effects on R2, supporting the hypothesis that the same underlying postponement process was operating. R1 response times were, however, dramatically delayed, and were now affected by S2 difficulty variables. The results provide strong support for postponement models of dual-task interference in the overlapping tasks paradigm, even when response times are delayed on both tasks.

This article examines the attentional limits responsible for task slowing in the overlapping task (refractory period) paradigm. Five experiments are reported in which stimulus factors were manipulated in visual search tasks performed in isolation or temporally overlapping with another task. Bottleneck models suggest that second-task slowing is caused by postponement of "attention-demanding" stages of the second task, while earlier "automatic" stages proceed unhindered. A prediction was derived from this class of models, namely that in the overlapping task condition the effect of second task factors that slow automatic stages should be reduced, whereas the effect of factors slowing later nonautomatic stages should be unchanged. The data (Experiments 1-4) exhibit such a pattern and suggest that encoding and comparison stages of the second task, but not response selection, occur in parallel with work on the first task. The absence of overadditive interactions in these experiments, and also the effects of manipulating first-task factors in Experiment 5, seems to argue against capacity sharing as the source of the slowing in this task combination. Some implications of these results for attention theory are discussed.