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This article identifies a central problem in the theory and practice of democracy in divided societies: the systematic exclusion of Others. Defining the exclusion-amidinclusion (EAI) dilemma of consociational power-sharing, whereby in including the main groups to the conflict it works to exclude those beyond these groups, the article offers the first systematic conceptualization of this issue. The article outlines the type of individuals and groups affected by the EAI dilemma, the varying strategies they adopt to navigate power-sharing frameworks and the potential routes out of this normative and empirical puzzle. Finally, it lays out a challenge for scholars to build on this conceptualization and address the EAI dilemma in future research. In 2016, the European Court of Human Rights ruled for the third time against the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). At stake was whether BiH's constitutional framework-a particularly rigid and complicated form of corporate consociationalism-violated the rights of non-constituent peoples to free and democratic elections and to freedom from discrimination. The court took issue with the electoral rules for the state presidency and the House of Peoples, both of which restrict access to BiH's constituent peoples-Bosniaks, Bosnian Serbs, and Bosnian Croats. The court sided with Ilijaz Pilav, a Bosniak living in the Republika Srpska, who could not contest the presidential elections on the basis of his residence, as the current rules restrict candidacy to Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats who live in the Federation of Bosnia of Herzegovina and to Bosnian Serbs who live in the Republika Srpska. This decision reinforced two earlier rulings. In Finci and Sejdić vs. Bosnia and Herzegovina (2009), the court determined that the electoral rules discriminated against members of the Jewish and Roma populations, who, as non-constituent peoples, were prohibited from reaching these offices. In Zornić vs. Bosnia and Herzegovina (2014), the court sided with Azra Zornić, who, because she was unwilling to declare an ethnic affiliation, was prohibited from contesting the election. Despite these rulings, the electoral rules remain in place and politicians remain deadlocked on how to revise them. In addition to their legal ramifications, the ECHR rulings expose an acute problem that emerges in consociational settings, which we refer to as the exclusion-amid-inclusion (EAI) dilemma. That is, the institutional inclusion of some groups necessarily results in the exclusion of others. As Jakob Finci noted in response to the 2009 ECHR ruling, the

An emerging tension characterizes conflict resolution practice: promoting power-sharing between ethnic groups while simultaneously mandating women's inclusion in peace processes and in post-conflict institutions. Scholars of ethnic conflict have not adequately theorized the gender implications of power-sharing, and practitioners have failed to implement mechanisms that would make power-sharing representative of constituencies beyond ethno-national cleavages. There is no substantive reason why the representation of women and ethnic groups should be in tension. Nevertheless, gender is often ignored in the power-sharing literature and gender-mainstreaming practices appear irreconcilable with power-sharing practice. Drawing on three cases of post-conflict power-sharingBosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, and Northern Ireland -this article identifies reasons why this tension remains in practice, especially the overriding emphasis in powersharing on ethno-nationalist elites and conflict protagonists.Over the last decade, conflict resolution scholars and practitioners have increasingly promoted power-sharing institutions in ethnically divided societies. Powersharing entails the participation and representation of all ethnic groups in conflict resolution and post-conflict institutions and, when confronted by ethnic conflicts, is favoured by international organizations including the UN. At the same time, international agencies and advocacy networks have been drawing attention to the role of women in peacebuilding. The UN calls for member states to increase women's participation in the negotiation and implementation of peace agreements. Drawing on UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000), on 'Women, Peace and Security' (WPS), feminist scholars and activists are carving out a role for women in conflict resolution and post-conflict peacebuilding. Yet a tension is evident: ethnic conflict scholars have yet to adequately theorize the gendered implications of power-sharing arrangements, while practitioners have yet to implement the kind of mechanisms that would make power-sharing constituencies representative beyond ethno-national-sectarian cleavages.This article examines three cases of ethnicized conflict in which power-sharing was implemented as part of a larger peace process. In two cases, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) in 1995 and Northern Ireland in 1998, power-sharing was adopted prior to Resolution 1325. In a third case, Burundi, a transitional peace agreement was adopted in 2000, and power-sharing was constitutionally enshrined in 2005. The cases illustrate some of the challenges in reconciling the inclusion of women with the inclusion of ethno-national groups. The analysis is centred on Resolution 1325, given its specific emphasis on women's

Centripetalism suggests that the best way to achieve political stability in deeply divided societies is to enhance the political rewards of moderation by adopting electoral rules that require winning politicians to seek cross-community support. This paper considers the validity of this position by examining election results in eight deeply divided societies-Nigeria, Sri Lanka, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Indonesia, Kenya and Northern Ireland-and argues that rather than consolidating moderation, the outcome is more likely to be increased instability, and even, in some cases, increased extremism.

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