This article identifies a central problem in the theory and practice of democracy in divided societies: the systematic exclusion of Others. Defining the exclusion-amidinclusion (EAI) dilemma of consociational power-sharing, whereby in including the main groups to the conflict it works to exclude those beyond these groups, the article offers the first systematic conceptualization of this issue. The article outlines the type of individuals and groups affected by the EAI dilemma, the varying strategies they adopt to navigate power-sharing frameworks and the potential routes out of this normative and empirical puzzle. Finally, it lays out a challenge for scholars to build on this conceptualization and address the EAI dilemma in future research. In 2016, the European Court of Human Rights ruled for the third time against the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). At stake was whether BiH's constitutional framework-a particularly rigid and complicated form of corporate consociationalism-violated the rights of non-constituent peoples to free and democratic elections and to freedom from discrimination. The court took issue with the electoral rules for the state presidency and the House of Peoples, both of which restrict access to BiH's constituent peoples-Bosniaks, Bosnian Serbs, and Bosnian Croats. The court sided with Ilijaz Pilav, a Bosniak living in the Republika Srpska, who could not contest the presidential elections on the basis of his residence, as the current rules restrict candidacy to Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats who live in the Federation of Bosnia of Herzegovina and to Bosnian Serbs who live in the Republika Srpska. This decision reinforced two earlier rulings. In Finci and Sejdić vs. Bosnia and Herzegovina (2009), the court determined that the electoral rules discriminated against members of the Jewish and Roma populations, who, as non-constituent peoples, were prohibited from reaching these offices. In Zornić vs. Bosnia and Herzegovina (2014), the court sided with Azra Zornić, who, because she was unwilling to declare an ethnic affiliation, was prohibited from contesting the election. Despite these rulings, the electoral rules remain in place and politicians remain deadlocked on how to revise them. In addition to their legal ramifications, the ECHR rulings expose an acute problem that emerges in consociational settings, which we refer to as the exclusion-amid-inclusion (EAI) dilemma. That is, the institutional inclusion of some groups necessarily results in the exclusion of others. As Jakob Finci noted in response to the 2009 ECHR ruling, the

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Civic political parties in divided societies occupy an ambiguous place in the power-sharing literature. Scholarship tends to focus on ethnic parties and assumes civic actors to be marginal. The empirical reality tells a different story: civic parties have contributed to peace, stability and democracy in some of the world’s most deeply divided places by playing a mediating role, acting as a moderating force and representing otherwise marginalised groups. Drawing from interviews with representatives from civic parties, ethnic parties and civil society in Northern Ireland and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and broader institutional analysis, I argue that civic parties’ survival can be explained by the fact that they meet therein not only with barriers but also critical openings. They adapt to this opportunity structure, with different party types developing under different forms of power-sharing. In illustrating the relationship between governance models and civic parties, this article underlines the importance of post-settlement institutional design.

This paper investigates the paradox in post-conflict societies of continued marginality of cross-ethnic parties despite significant convergence in public attitudes and identities. In so doing, it examines the argument that parties that attempt to reach across the divide are constrained by consocational institutions designed to accommodate rival identities in such environments. The paper explores this puzzle in the context of Northern Ireland, drawing upon qualitative evidence from elite interviews and focus groups collected in 2012 and 2013. It concludes that cross-community parties operating in the region do encounter formal institutional barriers, but that such barriers only partially explain the phenomenon and an interplay between formal and informal constraints underlies their position of relatively limited electoral success.

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