Power-Sharing and Political Stability in Deeply Divided Societies

McCulloch, Allison

doi:10.4324/9781315773698

Cited by 27 publications

(17 citation statements)

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“…If the parties already have reached a deadlock, the "gap between minority and majority preferences can sometimes be overcome with the assistance of third-party mediation in extreme cases." 110 This third party could be a neutral country or a state federation like the European Union.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Discursive Construction of Terrorist Group Identity

Rothenberger

Müller

Elmezeny

2016

Terrorism and Political Violence

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Discursive Construction of Terrorist Group Identity

Rothenberger

Müller

Elmezeny

2016

Terrorism and Political Violence

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“…Next, consociationalists claimed that all power-sharing is consociational (Lijphart 2001;McCulloch 2014;McCulloch and McGarry 2017). Other consociationalists reject this claim because (implausibly) it denies the existence of alternative non-consociational forms of power-sharing against which consociationalism had defined itself in the past (Bogaards et al 2019:1).…”

Section: Revisionist Consociationalism: All Power-sharing or No Powermentioning

confidence: 99%

Power‐Sharing in Deeply Divided Societies: Consociationalism and Sectarian Authoritarianism

Dixon

2020

Studies Ethnicity & National

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Consociationalists have traditionally embraced sectarian authoritarianism combined with a very limited form of democracy as the only democratic way of managing plural conflicts. New Generation consociationalists, by contrast, believe their theory is compatible with opposing sectarian authoritarianism in places like Iraq and the Lebanon. Traditional consociationalists have tended to claim that all power-sharing is consociational, whereas revisionist and liberal consociationalists claim that consociationalism does not require power-sharing and that the Iraqi Constitution of 2005 is therefore a consociational success. This paper argues that 'classic' consociationalism has constantly been revised to deflect criticism and capture apparently successful cases of conflict management. Consociationalists have deployed a 'Wonderland' definition which allows them to make such contradictory claims. Paradoxically, this definitional ambiguity and incoherence allows consociationalism to be 'all things to all people', resulting in its successful domination of the academic debate. Consociationalism in Wonderland The protests taking place in Lebanon and Iraq in 2019 and 2020 are protests against what Toby Dodge has appropriately called 'sectarian authoritarianism' (Dodge 2012). Yet the 'New Generation' of consociationalists, including Allison McCulloch and John Nagle, claim to support the revolutionary struggle against the sectarian ruling elites of Lebanon and Iraq (McCulloch 2014; but contrast Nagle and Clancy 2012 with Nagle 2020 in this issue and the critique of Nagle and Clancy in Dixon 2011). This is puzzling, because

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“…As McCulloch explains, ‘the SDA presents a pluralist platform but does so knowing that, as the representatives of the largest community in Bosnia, it would benefit from the introduction of majoritarian democracy’. Similarly, the more moderate Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina (SBiH) argues for the prioritisation of individual over group rights but remains essentially a Bosniak party (McCulloch : 37). Bosnian Serb parties, meanwhile, oppose any move towards a unitary state, which would involve the abolition of the RS, and Croat political parties have at times pushed for the establishment of a third, Croat entity.…”

Section: Budi Građanin/građanka: the Civic Campaignmentioning

confidence: 99%

To be a Bosniak or to be a citizen? Bosnia and Herzegovina's 2013 census as an election

Cooley

2019

Nations and Nationalism

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Bosnia and Herzegovina's first post‐war population census, held in 2013, was accompanied by campaigns associated with each of the country's three main ethnic groups, which sought to maximise their share of the recorded population. These campaigns were challenged by a rival ‘civic’ campaign that instead stressed the right to freedom of self‐identification, however. This article compares the aims, methods and framings used by this civic campaign with those of the most prominent of the ‘ethnic’ campaigns – that of Bosniak ethnic entrepreneurs. It demonstrates that the two campaigns were each motivated by a combination of symbolic motives, centred on recognition and highlighting discrimination, and instrumental motives relating to the country's power‐sharing institutions. The limited success of the civic campaign in countering the messages of its rival ethnic campaigns demonstrates the difficulties that civic movements face in mobilising citizens in consociational democracies such as BiH.

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Power-Sharing and Political Stability in Deeply Divided Societies

Cited by 27 publications

References 0 publications

The Discursive Construction of Terrorist Group Identity

The Discursive Construction of Terrorist Group Identity

Power‐Sharing in Deeply Divided Societies: Consociationalism and Sectarian Authoritarianism

To be a Bosniak or to be a citizen? Bosnia and Herzegovina's 2013 census as an election

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