The classic problem of stimulus-response (S-R) compatibility (SRC) is addressed. A cognitive model is proposed that views the stimulus and response sets in S-R ensembles as categories with dimensions that may or may not overlap. If they do overlap, the task may be compatible or incompatible, depending on the assigned S-R mapping. If they do not overlap, the task is noncompatible regardless of the assigned mapping. The overlapping dimensions may be relevant or not. The model provides a systematic account of SRC effects, a taxonomy of simple performance tasks that were hitherto thought to be unrelated, and suggestive parallels between these tasks and the experimental paradigms that have traditionally been used to study attentional, controlled, and automatic processes.

Measurements of reaction time have played a major role in developing theories about the menial processes that underlie sensation, perception, memory, cognition, and action. The interpretation of reaction time data requires strong assumptions about how subjects trade accuracy for speed of performance and about whether there is a discrete or continuous transmission of information from one component process to the next. Conventional reaction time and speed-accuracy trade-off procedures are not, by themselves, sufficiently powerful to test these assumptions. However, the deficiency can be remedied in part through a new speed-accuracy decomposition technique. To apply the technique, one uses a hybrid mixture of (a) conventional reaction time trials in which subjects must process a given test stimulus with high accuracy and (b) peremptory response-signal trials in which subjects must make prompted guesses before stimulus processing has been finished. Data from this "titrated reaction time procedure" are then analyzed in terms of a parallel sophisticated-guessing model, under which normal mental processes and guessing processes are assumed to race against each other in producing overt responses. With the model, one may estimate the amount of partial information that subjects have accumulated about a test stimulus at each intermediate moment during a reaction time trial. Such estimates provide deeper insights into the rate at which partial information is accumulated over time and into discrete versus continuous modes of information processing. An application of speed-accuracy decomposition to studies of word recognition illustrates the potential power of the technique. People do not think or act instantaneously. The time required to take action depends systematically on mental and physical processes that precede an overt response. Thus, throughout many areas of psychology, conclusions about the nature of mind and body have been based on measurements of human reaction time.' Past uses of reaction time data extend from studies of elementary sensory mechanisms (e.g., Green & Luce, 1973) to studies of perception (e.g.

Results are reported from a new paradigm that uses movement-related brain potentials to detect response preparation based on partial information. The paradigm uses a hybrid choice-reaction go/nogo procedure in which decisions about response hand and whether to respond are based on separate stimulus attributes. A lateral asymmetry in the movement-related brain potential was found on nogo trials without overt movement. The direction of this asymmetry depended primarily on the signaled response hand rather than on properties of the stimulus. When the asymmetry first appeared was influenced by the time required to select the signaled hand, and when it began to differ on go and nogo trials was influenced by the time to decide whether to respond. These findings indicate that both stimulus attributes were processed in parallel and that the asymmetry reflected preparation of the response hand that began before the go/nogo decision was completed.

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A countermanding procedure and race model are used to assess separately the effects of experimental factors before and after the "point of no return" in response preparation. The results reveal details about processes that so closely precede the initiation of movement that they cannot be inhibited. These processes appear to be affected by the repetition of stimulus-response pairs, but not by the physical or semantic properties of the stimuli. A model of response preparation is supported in which response inhibition depends upon the outcome of a race between independent excitatory and inhibitory processes, and reaction time is the sum of the durations of at least two stages, separated by the point of no return.