The events of September 11th have led to massive increases in personal, commercial, and governmental expenditures on anti-terrorism strategies, as well as a proliferation of programs designed to fight terrorism. These increases in spending and program development have focused attention on the most significant and central policy question related to these interventions: Are these programs effective? To explore this question, this study reports the results of a Campbell Collaboration systematic review on evaluation research of counter-terrorism strategies. Not only did we discover an almost complete absence of evaluation research on counter-terrorism interventions, but from those evaluations that we could find, it appears that some interventions either did not achieve the outcomes sought or sometimes increased the likelihood of terrorism occurring. The findings dramatically emphasize the need for government leaders, policy makers, researchers, and funding agencies to support both outcome evaluations of these programs as well as efforts to develop an infrastructure to foster counter-terrorism evaluation research.
The objective of this Campbell systematic review is to determine the effectiveness of counter‐terrorism strategies from the available social scientific research literature using systematic review methods.From over 20,000 studies we located on terrorism, we found only seven which contained moderately rigorous evaluations of counterterrorism programs. We conclude that there is little scientific knowledge about the effectiveness of most counter‐terrorism interventions. Further, from the evidence we were able to locate, it appears that some evaluated interventions either didn't work or sometimes increased the likelihood of terrorism and terrorism‐related harm.The findings of this review dramatically emphasize the need for government leaders, policy makers, researchers, and funding agencies to include and insist on evaluations of the effectiveness of these programs in their agendas. These agendas would include identifying ways to overcome methodological and data challenges often associated with terrorism research, increasing funding to evaluate existing programs through methodologically rigorous evaluation designs, and paying attention to existing evaluations of programs when implementing them. Further, programs should be assessed to establish if they cause more harm than good or if they create unanticipated consequences.
Canada's position vis-à-vis September 11 differs substantially from the United States' in both circumstance and rhetoric. Although Canada was not the target of the terrorist attack, the United States is Canada's closest neighbor. In the words of the Prime Minister in the weeks following September 11, the United States is "more like family than friends." Given this, how has the terrorist threat been interpreted for and communicated to the public by the Canadian state? Through ethnographic content analyses of the documents (speeches and press releases) found on the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) Web site, we consider the communications by the Canadian state with respect to the events of September 11. We analyze this information within the overarching frameworks of risk and trust. In terms of risk, we examine the Prime Minister's communications and the framing of this communication as it relates to the discourse of probable harm and/or benefit. As for trust, we consider the emphasis on reputation and how this affects the information provided and its delivery. These risk/trust underpinnings speak to the Canadian state's construction of security, security threats, and the construction of the Canadian state more generally.The Sociological Quarterly 46 (2005) 645-669
terrorism/terror.htm documents pre-18 th century CDISS Terrorism Program -Center for Defense and International Security Studies Terrorist incidents 1945 to 1998 Center for the Prevention of Genocide Country reports online Center for Non-Proliferation Studies Weapons of mass destruction database Center for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence-University of St. Andrews Terrorism incident database Center on Terrorism and Irregular Warfare Government databases. Suicide bombers.
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