Some writers have suggested that the classical Sunni kalām theory of divine attributes, which states that the attributes are 'neither God' nor 'other than God,' should be interpreted to mean a denial of the law of excluded middle. Some also seek to build a new kalām without such a principle. Although the author holds such a view to be unintelligible on its own grounds, it also has no basis in the classical kalām theory. This paper shall present a detailed investigation into the meaning of ghayr, and demonstrate, with ample textual evidence, that the classical theory of divine attributes only means a denial of identity along with the denial of metaphysical separability from the divine essence. This paper demonstrates how the term ghayr applies in contexts of metaphysics, theology, and natural philosophy as well. The formula that ‘something is not identical with’ nor ‘other than’ is applied equally to any property of a subject which is necessary and inseparable from it. That is, it applies equally to created beings as well. The paper shall begin with a linguistic discussion of the term ghayr, in order to demonstrate that it is not a negation in the Arabic language, but actually an adjective which also functions to form an exceptive clause. This proves that the formula on the divine attributes does not imply a rejection of excluded middle even at the basic linguistic level. Then the paper will discuss the term ghayr in technical contexts. This discussion does not limit itself to any school, but the discussion is based on four main sources: (1) the Maqālāt of al-Kaʿbī of the Muʿtazilī school; (2) the Maqālāt of al-Ashʿarī, (3) the Kitāb al-Tawḥīd and (4) the Taʾwīlāt of al-Māturīdī. Much attention is given to the latter because of claims by some that Māturīdī has a unique position on ghayriyya which implies the rejection of the law of excluded middle. There is no indication at all that such a formula implied a denial of the laws of logic. Claims to the contrary have failed to provide any linguistic or textual evidence for their interpretation, let alone philosophical justification for such a farfetched view.
اشتهر القول عند المتأخرين بأن المتقدمين من المتكلمين أثبتوا أن علة حاجة الأثر إلى المؤثر هو الحدوث، أو الحدوث والإمكان، أو الإمكان بشرط الحدوث. ثم فسّر بعض المتأخرين، على رأسهم السيد الشريف الجرجاني، أن مذهب الشيخ الأشعري ومتبعيه في عدم بقاء الأعراض مبني على كون علة الحاجة هي الحدوث. وذلك لأن القول بالحدوث يلزم منه استغناء العالم عن الصانع بعد حدوثه، فبحثوا عما يدفعوا ذلك اللزوم بأن الأعراض لا تبقى، ولما كان بقاء الجواهر محتاجة إلى الأعراض، والأعراض لا تبقى زمانين، بقيت الجواهر محتاجة إلى الصانع بعد حدوثها. فيعمد هذا البحث إلى النظر في هذا التحليل لمذهب الشيخ الأشعري وأئمة مدرسته. ويظهر من الرجوع إلى نصوص الأشاعرة المتقدمين، والمعتزلة البصريين، وكذلك نصوص ابن سينا، أن الأشاعرة لم يبنوا مذهبهم في عدم بقاء الأعراض على دفع ذلك اللزوم. بل لم يقولوا بأن علة الحاجة هي الحدوث أصلا، بل قالوا إنه الجواز والإمكان. وأما المعتزلة، فقد صرّحوا بأنه الحدوث، وذلك مبني على مذهبهم في ثبوت المعدوم. فلما كانت الذوات ثابتة في العدم، لم تحتج إلى الفاعل؛ وكل ما يثبت لها بعد الحدوث فهو مقتضى ذات الشيء؛ فلم يكن محتاجاً إلى الفاعل إلا في الحدوث والخروج من العدم إلى الوجود. بل صرّحوا أيضا أن الأثر لا يحتاج إلى الصانع بعد الحدوث أيضا، وبينوا ذلك بالقياس إلى البنّاء والبيت. فشنّع عليهم الأشاعرة المتقدمون، وكذلك ابن سينا في الإشارات والتنبيهات، والنجاة، والشفاء، وغيرها من كتبه. فذلك البعض من المتأخرين عمموا القول بأن الحدوث علة للحاجة، ثم فسروا كلام الأشعري في عدم بقاء الأعراض وفقاً لذلك. والحق أن مذهبه مبني على الإمكان، وذلك لأن الجوهر جائزاً بقاؤه وجائزاً عدمه، فيفتقر إلى مرجح في الزمان الثاني، وذلك الترجيح يجب أن يكون أمرا زائداً على نفس الذات، وإلا لزم تحصيل الحاصل، وذلك الزائد يجب أن يكون عرضاً، ولما استحال قيام العرض بالعرض، لم يجز أن يبق العرض لعدم القابلية، وجاز أن يبقى الجوهر، لاحتماله الأعراض.
This article examines the role of scepticism in the Islamic philosophical tradition. It begins with a treatment of the origins and purpose of these discussions in classical kal am (c. 800-1100 CE). Then it moves on to the more mature discussions treating five forms of scepticism in the post-classical period (c.1200-1800 CE), with the aim of demonstrating how they construed scepticism, the arguments for and against it, and what purposes scepticism played in their system. Three of these types of scepticism are unrestricted, meaning that their denial of knowledge is universal. The other two types are restricted to a denial of inferential knowledge, either entirely, or in certain subjects such as metaphysics and natural philosophy. The discussion will focus on two of the most widely studied works of kal am: Saʿd al-Din al-Taft az anī's Sharḥ al-ʿAq aʾid al-Nasafiyya and Jal al al-Dīn al-Daw anī's Sharḥ al-ʿAq aʾid al-ʿAḍudiyya, including some of their supercommentaries.
In recent years, there has been notable interest in Islamic philosophy and theology from an analytic and not merely historical perspective. One important area of research that has garnered a great deal of research is the arguments for the existence of God. Recent work by Hannah Erlwein seeks to argue that this research has been in vain, for there are no arguments for the existence of God in classical Islamic thought. This paper analyzes Erlwein’s strategies in justifying this position, revealing that her research ignores an enormous amount of evidence that runs contrary to her thesis, in addition to demonstrating many of the errors and shortcomings in her work. Most disturbingly, the book seeks to present the Islamic philosophical tradition as fideistic and unintellectual based on a series of contrived interpretations of rather clear texts. In response, this paper demonstrates the importance of independent inquiry in the Islamic tradition by looking at a wide range of different relevant texts.
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.
customersupport@researchsolutions.com
10624 S. Eastern Ave., Ste. A-614
Henderson, NV 89052, USA
Copyright © 2024 scite LLC. All rights reserved.
Made with 💙 for researchers
Part of the Research Solutions Family.