Zur Zustimmungsbedürftigkeit von Bundesgesetzen: Eine kritische Bilanz nach einem Jahr Föderalismusreform I

A Successful Failure? The Contested Implications of Germany's Federal Reforms

“…However, these other provisions, elaborated below, were not reformed, i.e., they still apply. 55 Furthermore, regarding this significant number of laws, it can be assumed that, before the reform, the reference to the 'old' Article 84 was sufficient whereas today, after the reform, other constitutional provisions that were retained substitute for the abolished norm. 56 Thus, some acts that would require Bundesrat consent under the 'old' Article 84 still require this approval despite the omission of the old norm.…”

“…This would have been a reduction of 15 percentage points, rather than only 5, as I previously argued. 7 However, this counterfactual result is only possible when taking a restrictive interpretation. It assumes that all laws that theoretically could have required Bundesrat consent under previous federal law (because of their effect on the Länder administrations), would have been adopted as such laws requiring the consent of the Bundesrat.…”

“…1,4,7,8,12,13,14,19,20,21,22: For these 11 acts, one may reasonably assume that the consent requirement was only avoided because of the reform. Even a strategic government would not have been able to officially proclaim these laws as 'consent-free' laws under old Article 84.…”

Arraying institutional layers in federalism reforms: lessons from the German case

“…Accordingly, research on the German reform process focuses on details of the issues at stake and their likely consequences. This includes for example the redistribution of legislative responsibilities in the first reform stage (Georgii and Borhanian, 2006;Höreth, 2007;Burkhart et al, 2008), a critical evaluation of the debt brake and concomitant provisions of administrative cooperation in the second phase (Baus, 2007;Feld, 2010;Kastrop et al, 2010), and controversial analyses of the principles and techniques stipulating how to distribute and redistribute public revenues among the federal units in the third reform step (Geißler et al, 2015). Other contributions are dedicated to actors and the normative arguments they employ to promote their preferred vision of the reform (Münch and Zinterer, 2000;Hrbek, 2003).…”

Parlament und Zweite Kammer in der westdeutschen Verfassungsdiskussion von 1946 bis zum Parlamentarischen Rat

“…Entsprechendes galt für Gerhard Schröder, nachdem seine rot-grüne Koalition mit der Hessen-Wahl vom Februar 1999 die Abstimmungsmehrheit im Bundesrat verloren hatte 63 . Nach mehreren Anläufen gelang der Großen Koalition im Jahre 2006 der erste Teil einer Föderalismusreform, mit deren Hilfe man hoff t, die Zahl der Zustimmungsgesetze zu begrenzen und kleinen Koalitionen das Regieren zu erleichtern 64 . Auch bei weiteren Reformversuchen, insbesondere im Bereich der Finanzverfassung, kann man auf die 1948/49 diskutierten Alternativen zurückgreifen.…”