Young children's understanding of interpretation, expectation and direct perception as sources of false belief

Abstract

Two experiments investigated children's understanding that mistaken beliefs may arise through misinterpretation of ambiguous information. In Expt 1, 4‐ and 5‐yearolds accurately attributed false beliefs based on direct perception, but did not attribute false beliefs based on inferential or interpretive processes. Experiment 2 compared children's ability to predict another person's interpretation with children's ability to explain another person's interpretation after the fact. Although 4‐year‐olds often provided valid explanations, 7‐year‐olds were more likely than 4‐year‐olds to refer to another person's previous experiences to explain the person's interpretation. References to previous experiences were positively correlated with the ability to predict another person's interpretation. These results support the view that understanding false belief and understanding interpretive activity are distinct conceptual acquisitions.

Understanding minds and evidence for belief: A study of Mofu children in Cameroon

“…But the man's inability to lift the box is the evidence that contributes to his belief that the box is heavy. Mofu children seem to be able to lay aside their visual evidence and attend to the other's tactile evidence at about the same age as children from more typically studied populations begin to understand the inferential basis of knowledge (e.g., Pillow et al, 2000 ;Pillow & Mash, 1999). However, when the question is hypothetical (i.e., the man has not actually come back to lift the now empty container) and the children must lay aside their visual evidenc e in favour of imagined future evidence, they do not perform well.…”

Beyond Sally's Missing Marble

“…This contrasts with the timetable for false-belief tasks, which are typically mastered by age 5 ). Researchers who have tested the same children on both false-belief and IToM tasks report that children's pass rates for false-belief measures are significantly higher than IToM measures (Carpendale & Chandler, 1996;Lalonde & Chandler, 2002;Mull & Evans, 2010;Pillow & Mash, 1999). IToM tasks are presumably more difficult than false-belief tasks because they require children to actively construct different beliefs for different individuals and to recognize that one event can provoke multiple interpretations.…”

Sibling composition, executive function, and children’s thinking about mental diversity

“…This contrasts with false belief understanding (knowledge that a person's thoughts can be wrong), which children typically master around their fourth birthday (Wellman et al, 2001). Awareness that there can be many ways to interpret the same situation and that prior experiences shape these psychological reactions (IToM) continues to improve through middle childhood and beyond (see also Barquero, Robinson, & Thomas, 2003;Lagattuta et al, 2015;Pillow, 2012;Pillow & Henrichon, 1996;Pillow & Mash, 1999;Ruffman, Olson, & Astington, 1991).…”