No abstract

Three experiments investigated children's understanding of inference as a source of knowledge. Children observed a puppet make a statement about the color of one of two hidden toys after the puppet (a) looked directly at the toy (looking), (b) looked at the other toy (inference), or (c) looked at neither toy (guessing). Most 4-, 5-, and 6-year-olds did not rate the puppet as being more certain of the toy's color after the puppet looked directly at it or inferred its color than they did after the puppet guessed its color. Most 8 and 9-year-olds distinguished inference and looking from guessing. The tendency to explain the puppet's knowledge by referring to inference increased with age. Children who referred to inference in their explanations were more likely to judge deductive inference as more certain than guessing.

Two experiments investigated kindergarten through fourth-grade children's and adults' (N = 128) ability to (1) evaluate the certainty of deductive inferences, inductive inferences, and guesses; and (2) explain the origins of inferential knowledge. When judging their own cognitive state, children in first grade and older rated deductive inferences as more certain than guesses; but when judging another person's knowledge, children did not distinguish valid inferences from invalid inferences and guesses until fourth grade. By third grade, children differentiated their own deductive inferences from inductive inferences and guesses, but only adults both differentiated deductive inferences from inductive inferences and differentiated inductive inferences from guesses. Children's recognition of their own inferences may contribute to the development of knowledge about cognitive processes, scientific reasoning, and a constructivist epistemology.

Four experiments investigated 3‐ and 4‐year‐olds' understanding that different perceptual modalities provide knowledge about different aspects of the world. In Expt 1, children were asked to choose among looking, listening and touching as means of discovering an object's colour, sound or shape, and to choose which of two puppets, each of whom had performed a different perceptual act, could provide information about an object's colour, sound or shape. In Expt 2, children were asked to direct a puppet's actions or decide what they themselves should do to acquire information about a hidden object. Four‐year‐olds performed better than 3‐ year‐olds, but neither age group performed consistently above chance for all three object properties. In Expt 3 neither 3‐ nor 4‐year‐olds chose correctly between looking and listening, but both age groups correctly chose a perceptual act, rather than a non‐perceptual act, as means of obtaining information. In Expt 4, 4‐ and 5‐ year‐olds usually attributed knowledge of colour or sound correctly following perceptual or non‐perceptual actions, but 3‐year‐olds made frequent errors. The results are interpreted as evidence that 3‐ and 4‐year‐olds understand that know‐ledge occurs in the presence of perceptual access, but do not know which aspects of knowledge are related to which modalities of perceptual access.

5 experiments investigated children's understanding that expectations based on prior experience may influence a person's interpretation of ambiguous visual information. In Experiment 1, 4- and 5-year-olds were asked to infer a puppet's interpretation of a small, ambiguous portion of a line drawing after the puppet had been led to have an erroneous expectation about the drawing's identity. Children of both ages failed to ascribe to the puppet an interpretation consistent with the puppet's expectation. Instead, children attributed complete knowledge of the drawing to the puppet. In Experiment 2, the task was modified to reduce memory demands, but 4- and 5-year-olds continued to overlook the puppet's prior expectations when asked to infer the puppet's interpretation of an ambiguous scene. 6-year-olds responded correctly. In Experiment 3, 4- and 5-year-olds correctly reported that an observer who saw a restricted view would not know what was in the drawing, but children did not realize that the observer's interpretation might be mistaken. Experiments 4 and 5 explored the possibility that children's errors reflect difficulty inhibiting their own knowledge when responding. The results are taken as evidence that understanding of interpretation begins at approximately age 6 years.

5 experiments investigated children's understanding that expectations based on prior experience may influence a person's interpretation of ambiguous visual information. In Experiment 1, 4- and 5-year-olds were asked to infer a puppet's interpretation of a small, ambiguous portion of a line drawing after the puppet had been led to have an erroneous expectation about the drawing's identity. Children of both ages failed to ascribe to the puppet an interpretation consistent with the puppet's expectation. Instead, children attributed complete knowledge of the drawing to the puppet. In Experiment 2, the task was modified to reduce memory demands, but 4- and 5-year-olds continued to overlook the puppet's prior expectations when asked to infer the puppet's interpretation of an ambiguous scene. 6-year-olds responded correctly. In Experiment 3, 4- and 5-year-olds correctly reported that an observer who saw a restricted view would not know what was in the drawing, but children did not realize that the observer's interpretation might be mistaken. Experiments 4 and 5 explored the possibility that children's errors reflect difficulty inhibiting their own knowledge when responding. The results are taken as evidence that understanding of interpretation begins at approximately age 6 years.

In the present study, the authors investigated age differences in children's understanding (a) that a person's behavior may contribute to the formation of a shared opinion within the peer group and (b) that origins of a reputation can be direct or indirect. The authors read stories in which a target character engaged in either prosocial or antisocial interactions with peers to children in kindergarten, 2nd, and 4th grade. They then asked the children to judge how various peers viewed the target character. Children's explanations indicated that children in all of those age groups understood that firsthand experience influenced peers' opinions, and by 2nd grade, children understood that indirect experience or gossip also might have contributed to an individual's reputation.

The understanding of inference as a source of knowledge for 4- and 6-year-old children was investigated. Children and a puppet were shown 2 toys of different colors. The toys were hidden in separate plastic cans. After the puppet looked into 1 of the cans, 6-year-olds, but not 4-year-olds, usually judged that the puppet knew the color of the toy in the other can as well. The finding that 6-year-olds attributed inferential knowledge to another observer is interpreted as evidence that children begin to understand the role of cognitive processes in knowledge acquisition around the age of 6 years.