X-Phi and Carnapian Explication

Abstract

The rise of experimental philosophy (x-phi) has placed metaphilosophical questions, particularly those concerning concepts, at the center of philosophical attention. X-phi offers empirically rigorous methods for identifying conceptual content, but what exactly it contributes towards evaluating conceptual content remains unclear. We show how x-phi complements Rudolf Carnap’s underappreciated methodology for concept determination, explication. This clarifies and extends x-phi’s positive philosophical import, and also exhibits explication’s broad appeal. But there is a potential problem: Carnap’s account of explication was limited to empirical and logical concepts, but many concepts of interest to philosophers (experimental and otherwise) are essentially normative. With formal epistemology as a case study, we show how x-phi assisted explication can apply to normative domains.

Experimental Philosophy of Explanation Rising: The Case for a Plurality of Concepts of Explanation

“…First, these judgments have a valuable role to play in explication preparation. For example, they can provide philosophers with evidence helpful to identify the explicatum's central features and its relation with other concepts; or they can point to sources of bias that affect judgment about alleged cases of genuine explanation (Shepherd & Justus, 2014;Section 3;Waskan, Harmon, Horne, Spino, & Clevenger, 2014).…”

Does Experimental Philosophy Have a Role to Play in Carnapian Explication?

“…Joshua Shepherd and James Justus () argue that experimental philosophy can be incorporated, perhaps surprisingly, into Carnap's () method of explication: they propose that experimental philosophy play a clarificatory role in the initial preparatory stage of explication. Shepherd and Justus take themselves to have highlighted ‘a compelling new positive program for [experimental philosophy]’ (2015, p. 391).…”

The constituents of an explication

“…Justus (2012), Schupbach (2015), and Shepherd and Justus (2015) make some contributions from experimental philosophy. Interestingly, Justus (2012, p. 162) observes a related methodological deficit in contemporary (meta)philosophy as I do: "Rather than become a staple of philosophical methodology, explication has been challenged on several grounds."…”