The constituents of an explication

Abstract

The method of explication has been somewhat of a hot topic in the last ten years. Despite the multifaceted research that has been directed at the issue, one may perceive a lack of step-by-step procedural or structural accounts of explication. This paper aims at providing a structural account of the method of explication in continuation of the works of Geo Siegwart. It is enhanced with a detailed terminology for the assessment and comparison of explications. The aim is to provide means to talk about explications including their criticisms and their interrelations. There is hope that this treatment will be able to serve as a foundation to a step-by-step guide to be established for explicators. At least it should help to frame and mediate explicative disputes. In closing the enterprise will be considered an explication of 'explication', though consecutive explications improving on this one are undoubtedly conceivable.

Józef M. Bocheński and the categorial reconstruction of concepts in the Lvov–Warsaw School

“…4 Reconstructive elements, which are crucial in conceptual analysis as it was practiced in the LSW, appear also in two other types of conceptual research within the analytical movement. Firstly, there are obvious analogies between the reconstructive analysis and the procedure of explication that was sketched by Carnap (1950) and recently developed by many authors [see, for instance, Carus (2007), Cordes (2017)]. It is, however, interesting that Carnap took as a typical example of explication Tarski's analysis of the concept of truth, which definitely belongs to the tradition of the Lvov-Warsaw School.…”

Are Metaphysical Claims Testable?

“…Various attempts to explicate "explication" 2 , have found their way within the analytic tradition. In this paper, Ι have chosen to refer to a recent account, due to Cordes (2017), which, generally, is considered compatible with the Carnapian view despite some differences 3 .…”

“…This condition, (6), deals effectively with the well-known problem of producing trivial alternative hypotheses from a given one, simply by "tacking on" it any other claim. 7 What would be the source of such an alternative hypothesis, ′? One way to understand ′ Finally, notice that conditions (3a), (4), entail that…”

“…Conditions(6) and(7) are not required by Psillos, although he discussed the problem of inferring the prediction from trivial hypotheses. He notes that "there are senses in which all theoretical assertions are eliminable, if, for instance we take the Craig-transform of a theory, or we "cook up" a hypothesis * [it would be ′ in our discussion] by writing [ ] into it.…”

Which Concept of Concept for Conceptual Engineering?

“… See Brun (2016,Cordes (2020), Dutilh Novaes and Reck (2017), Dutilh Novaes (2020a),Pinder (2017Pinder ( , 2020,Schupbach (2017),Shepherd and Justus (2015) on how to overcome the limitations of Carnapian explication in the spirit of conceptual engineering.7 As Nado (2020a: 17) puts it: "[A] concept is successful if it effectively fulfills its functions-in short, if it is effective. We could say, then, that the goal of conceptual engineering is to design effective concepts[…].…”