Experimental Philosophy of Explanation Rising: The Case for a Plurality of Concepts of <i>Explanation</i>

Colombo, Matteo

doi:10.1111/cogs.12340

Cited by 17 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 55 publications

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“…They also go beyond description-they are genuine explanations in answering why-questions to yield explanatory understanding. While previous work has documented several forms of explanatory pluralism (e.g., Colombo, 2017;Lombrozo, 2011Lombrozo, , 2012, both descriptively and normatively, such distinctions usually fall within the category of abstractive explanations. The contribution of this paper is in articulating an alternative to abstractive explanation with a unique cognitive and epistemic profile.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Experiential Explanation

Aronowitz

Lombrozo

2019

Topics in Cognitive Science

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People often answer why-questions with what we call experiential explanations: narratives or stories with temporal structure and concrete details. In contrast, on most theories of the epistemic function of explanation, explanations should be abstractive: structured by general relationships and lacking extraneous details. We suggest that abstractive and experiential explanations differ not only in level of abstraction, but also in structure, and that each form of explanation contributes to the epistemic goals of individual learners and of science. In particular, experiential explanations support mental simulation and survive transitions across background theories; as a result, they support learning and help us translate between competing frameworks. Experiential explanations play an irreducible role in human cognition-and perhaps in science.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Experiential Explanation

Aronowitz

Lombrozo

2019

Topics in Cognitive Science

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“…On the other hand, the multitude of relevant factors in explanatory judgment explains why it has been difficult to come up with a theory of abductive inference that is both normatively compelling and descriptively accurate: after all, it is difficult to fit quite diverse determinants of explanatory judgment into a single unifying framework. In that spirit, we hope that our results will promote an interdisciplinary conversation between empirical evidence and philosophical theorizing, and about the “prospects for a naturalized philosophy of explanation” in particular (Lombrozo, 2011 ; Colombo, 2017 ; Schupbach, 2017 ).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 82%

Determinants of Judgments of Explanatory Power: Credibility, Generality, and Statistical Relevance

2017

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Explanation is a central concept in human psychology. Drawing upon philosophical theories of explanation, psychologists have recently begun to examine the relationship between explanation, probability and causality. Our study advances this growing literature at the intersection of psychology and philosophy of science by systematically investigating how judgments of explanatory power are affected by (i) the prior credibility of an explanatory hypothesis, (ii) the causal framing of the hypothesis, (iii) the perceived generalizability of the explanation, and (iv) the relation of statistical relevance between hypothesis and evidence. Collectively, the results of our five experiments support the hypothesis that the prior credibility of a causal explanation plays a central role in explanatory reasoning: first, because of the presence of strong main effects on judgments of explanatory power, and second, because of the gate-keeping role it has for other factors. Highly credible explanations are not susceptible to causal framing effects, but they are sensitive to the effects of normatively relevant factors: the generalizability of an explanation, and its statistical relevance for the evidence. These results advance current literature in the philosophy and psychology of explanation in three ways. First, they yield a more nuanced understanding of the determinants of judgments of explanatory power, and the interaction between these factors. Second, they show the close relationship between prior beliefs and explanatory power. Third, they elucidate the nature of abductive reasoning.

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“…We hypothesize that the lack of a fully realized approach may be the result of considering generation only retrospectively, that is, by hypothesizing about what might lead to particular explanatory outcomes. For instance, Colombo (2017) recognizes that multiple forms of explanation are possible and then hypothesizes that a Bpreliminary step^in generating an explanation involves identifying the kind of explanation the individual intends to offer. Although we agree that we must account for explanatory pluralism, we do not believe that explainers begin with a sense of the kind of explanation they would like to offer and then go searching for answers that satisfy that form of explanation.…”

Section: Some Notions Of What Is Required To Generate An Explanationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Although much of the work related to explanation generation has focused specifically on causal explanations, multiple forms of explanation are available (Colombo, 2017;Lombrozo, 2012;Saatsi & Pexton, 2013;Van Bouwel & Weber, 2008; although see Skow, 2014). The form provides the way in which the answer relates to explanandum, for example, as a mechanism that causes the crying, as an adaptation that contributes to the onion's survival, or as an essential feature of the onion.…”

Section: The Contrastive Approach To the Generation Of Explanationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Many people investigate explanation in hopes of understanding other cognitive tasks, such a justification. For instance, some have explored the evaluation of explanations with an eye toward securing the epistemic value of a claim on the basis of its explanatory power (Colombo, 2017). Some of the contextual constraints we identify in this account may not apply to these other tasks.…”

Section: Concluding Thoughtsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A contrastive account of explanation generation

Chin-Parker

Bradner

2017

Psychon Bull Rev

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In this article, we propose a contrastive account of explanation generation. Though researchers have long wrestled with the concepts of explanation and understanding, as well as with the procedures by which we might evaluate explanations, less attention has been paid to the initial generation stages of explanation. Before an explainer can answer a question, he or she must come to some understanding of the explanandum-what the question is asking-and of the explanatory form and content called for by the context. Here candidate explanations are constructed to respond to the particular interpretation of the question, which, according to the pragmatic approach to explanation, is constrained by a contrast class-a set of related but nonoccurring alternatives to the topic that emerge from the surrounding context and the explainer's prior knowledge. In this article, we suggest that generating an explanation involves two operations: one that homes in on an interpretation of the question, and a second one that locates an answer. We review empirical work that supports this account, consider the implications of these contrastive processes, and identify areas for future study.

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Experimental Philosophy of Explanation Rising: The Case for a Plurality of Concepts of Explanation

Cited by 17 publications

References 55 publications

Experiential Explanation

Experiential Explanation

Determinants of Judgments of Explanatory Power: Credibility, Generality, and Statistical Relevance

A contrastive account of explanation generation

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