Would Higher Salaries Keep Teachers in High-Poverty Schools? Evidence from a Policy Intervention in North Carolina

Abstract

For a three-year time period beginning in 2001, North Carolina awarded an annual bonus of $1,800 to certified math, science and special education teachers working in high poverty or academically failing public secondary schools. Using longitudinal data on teachers, we estimate hazard models that identify the impact of this differential pay by comparing turnover patterns before and after the program's implementation, across eligible and ineligible categories of teachers, and across eligible and barely-ineligible schools. Results suggest that this bonus payment was sufficient to reduce mean turnover rates of the targeted teachers by 12%. Experienced teachers exhibited the strongest response to the program. Finally, the effect of the program may have been at least partly undermined by the state's failure to fully educate teachers regarding the eligibility criteria. Our estimates most likely underpredict the potential outcome of a program of permanent salary differentials operating under complete information. The twin topics of teacher quality and teacher compensation have garnered considerable attention from researchers and policy-makers in recent years. This attention has been motivated in part by the desire to increase the quality of individuals who select into the teaching profession, and to prevent attrition from culling the most qualified individuals from the ranks of teachers (Corcoran, Evans and Schwab 2004;Hoxby and Leigh 2004). A second motivation has been concern about the uneven distribution of effective teachers across schools. Numerous studies have documented the tendency for the most qualified teachers to gravitate toward schools that serve relatively well-off children, even though salaries are often no higher in such schools (Lankford, Loeb and Wyckoff 2002;Scafidi, Sjoquist and Stinebrickner 2002;Hanushek, Kain and Rivkin 2004;Reed, Rueben and Barbour 2006). As states and local districts feel increasing pressure to comply with the No Child Left Behind Act's mandate that each classroom contain a "highly qualified" teacher, evidence on policy interventions that successfully recruit outstanding candidates and distribute them equitably becomes more and more valuable.One obvious policy tool to deal with the quality and distribution of teachers would be to increase teachers' monetary compensation, perhaps in a targeted way. As straightforward as that suggestion might seem, however, a large and growing body of evidence suggests that the power of higher salaries to attract better teachers to the profession is limited (Hanushek, Kain and Rivkin, 1999;Loeb and Page 2000), and that offering teachers pay differentials to take jobs in low-performing schools is not a cost-effective means of improving test scores, particularly when the pay differential consists of a one-time signing bonus rather than a permanent salary increase (Fowler, 2003). Signing bonuses, absent other contractual provisions, may influence the attraction of teachers to schools but offer no incentive for teachers to stay once they have ...

Urban density and pupil attainment

“…Hanushek, Kain, O'Brien, and Rivkin [23] suggest that the opposite is true: teachers moving from Texan urban state schools to suburban/rural schools, as well as teachers leaving the state education system, are on average less effective at raising pupil attainments than teachers who stay. Additionally, Clotfelter, Glennie, Ladd, and Vidgor [6] show that a pecuniary bonus granted to the most qualified teachers in North Carolina greatly reduced their hazard rate for exit from high-poverty urban schools; similar evidence is provided by Hanushek and Rivkin [21] and Lavy [30]. Overall, it seems that city schools are in a favourable position to exploit urban labour markets to hire and retain high-quality educators.…”

“…We use information on these three cohorts -those aged 16 in From this large and complex combined data set we are able to construct a balanced panel providing information on three cohorts of over 400,000 pupils each, observed over three academic years, attending more than 14,000 Primary schools (when aged 11) and around 2,800 Secondary schools (when aged 16). We include only those pupils who are in schools that do not admit students on the basis of academic ability and we do not have data on pupils attending private schools 6 . We will use this information to estimate the influence of changes in urban density resulting from 5 Prior to 2002 this information was collected only at school level.…”

“…We will use this information to estimate the influence of changes in urban density resulting from 5 Prior to 2002 this information was collected only at school level. 6 Private schools educate around 6-7% of pupils in England as a whole.…”

Le décrochage enseignant : état des connaissances

“…La faiblesse du salaire (Billingsley 2004;Buchanan 2010;Certo and Fox 2002;Clotfelter et al 2008;Dolton and Van der Klaauw 1999;Gonzales 1995;Gonzalez et al 2008;Guarino et al 2006;Hahs-Vaughn and Scherff 2008;Ingersoll 2001;Macdonald 1999;McCreight 2000) est l'aspect le plus cité. Toutefois, quelques études tendent à relativiser le « poids » du salaire comme facteur de décrochage (Brill and McCartney 2008;FCE 2004;McCreight 2000;OCDE 2005;Ondrich et al 2008;Podgursky et al 2004).…”

Equal Opportunities?

“…Interesting in this respect are numerous studies that have documented the tendency of the most qualified teachers to gravitate toward schools that serve relatively well-off students, even though the salaries are often no higher in such schools. There is also a large body of evidence that suggests that the power of higher salaries to attract teachers is limited, particularly when the pay differential consists of a one-time signing bonus rather than a permanent salary increase (for example, Clotfelder et al, 2008).…”