Work, family, Fatherland: the political economy of populism in central and Eastern Europe

Abstract

Since 2008, Hungary and Poland have developed a distinctive populist economic program, which has begun to spread to other Central and East European Countries (CEECs). This article develops a theory of the political economy of populism in CEECs, arguing that these countries' dependence on foreign capital constrained them to follow (neo)liberal economic policies. After the global financial crisis, populist parties began to break from the (neo)liberal consensus, "thickening" their populist agenda to include an economic program based on a conservative developmental statism. Case studies of Hungary, Poland, and Serbia describe these policies and show that they exhibit a particular form of economic nationalism that emphasizes workforce activation, natalism, and sovereignty. This shift has gone hand-in-hand with attempts to attract investments from Eastern authoritarian states, illustrating the connection between CEEC development strategies and sources of foreign capital.

Taking back control: comprador bankers and managerial developmentalism in Poland

“…CEE countries had become 'global leaders' in the adoption of market-oriented reforms from the 1990s (Appel & Orenstein, 2018, p. 11) and their pursuit of a growth strategy based on exceptional openness to foreign direct investment (FDI) has turned them into 'dependent market economies' (DMEs) where foreign multinational corporations (MNCs) dominate lead sectors, notably banking and export-oriented manufacturing (Bohle, 2018;Bohle & Greskovits, 2012;Drahokoupil, 2009; N€ olke & Vliegenthart, 2009; Appendix A.2, Supplementary material). A nationalist and illiberal turn in the regionparticularly in Hungary and Polandin the 2010s has drawn attention to a shift towards 'unorthodox' economic policiesincluding bank renationalization and the pursuit of industrial policywith most analysts suggesting that conservative-nationalist parties' statist mindset has propelled this shift (Appel & Orenstein, 2018;Johnson and Barnes, 2015;Bluhm & Varga, 2020;Bohle & Greskovits, 2019;Bugari c & Orenstein, 2020;Jasiecki, 2019;Topli sek, 2020). Yet what if business plays a much more active role in these processes than assumed?…”

Pandemic populism: COVID-19 and the rise of the Nationalist AUR party in Romania

“…This paper will explore the recent rise of the AUR, with a view to reflecting on the different strands of recent political disquiet that have contributed to the rise of populism in Romania. Findings have wider applicability to the rise of nationalism and populism in East-Central Europe in particular (adding to the work of Gherghina & Miscoiu, 2014;Orenstein & Bugaric, 2020;Pirro, 2015) and across Europe and other parts of the world (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008;Brubaker, 2017;Brubaker, 2020a;Brubaker, 2020b;de Cleen & Stavrakakis, 2017;Taggart, 2000). The study aims: a) to understand the spatial distribution of votes for AUR in Romania b) and to explore the ways in which the COVID-19 pandemic has created conditions that are conducive to the AUR's success in certain regions c) to assess responses of the educated younger Romanians to the content and style of the AUR's political ideology…”

“…In Central-Eastern Europe, the 2008 financial crisis combined with shifts in the relationships between individual states and the European Union has given this rhetoric considerable power. In Poland, Hungary, and Serbia, the perceived failure of the neoliberal consensus has led to an intensified form of economic nationalism, which emphasizes sovereignty (often a conservative statism), natalism, and workforce activation (Orenstein & Bugaric, 2020).…”

The precariat pandemic: Exploitation overshadowed by COVID-19 and workers’ strategies in Poland

“…In return they offered 'nationalist, authoritarian populism, combined with a welfare chauvinist social policy, promising to protect ordinary people from liberal elites'. However, this conservative-populist political project only offers limited forms of redistribution with no real strengthening of labour rights (Orenstein and Bugarič, 2020). The pandemic well exposed the alleged 'social' character of the PiS's policies in Poland.…”