Less than two decades after the triumphant "return to Europe," the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) are facing a serious crisis of constitutional democracy. Following the example of Russia's "managed" democracy, a new form of illiberal regime is emerging in postcommunist Europe. 1 In such regimes, political parties seek to capture the state for their own ideological or economic gains by dismantling key rule-of-law institutions. As in Moscow, the governments of these countries maintain the superficial appearance of democracy by holding elections, while seeking to undermine any institutional safeguards that could prevent them from maintaining power in perpetuity. Constitutional courts are central targets in these efforts. The populist and anti-liberal wave sweeping Central and Eastern Europe has featured assaults on the institutions that mediate between government and the people. 2 Western democracies tend to be more successful at fending off attacks on liberal institutions because Western courts, media, human-rights organizations, and ombudsmen have longer and betterdeveloped traditions of independence and professionalism, and because these institutions mutually reinforce one another. Conversely, where such institutions are weak and underdeveloped, as they are in CEE countries, there is always the potential danger of a drift toward "illiberal democracy," and even authoritarianism.
Since 2008, Hungary and Poland have developed a distinctive populist economic program, which has begun to spread to other Central and East European Countries (CEECs). This article develops a theory of the political economy of populism in CEECs, arguing that these countries' dependence on foreign capital constrained them to follow (neo)liberal economic policies. After the global financial crisis, populist parties began to break from the (neo)liberal consensus, "thickening" their populist agenda to include an economic program based on a conservative developmental statism. Case studies of Hungary, Poland, and Serbia describe these policies and show that they exhibit a particular form of economic nationalism that emphasizes workforce activation, natalism, and sovereignty. This shift has gone hand-in-hand with attempts to attract investments from Eastern authoritarian states, illustrating the connection between CEEC development strategies and sources of foreign capital.
Populism is on the rise in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Persistent attacks on legal institutions of liberal democracy represent the most troubling aspect of the rising populism in CEE. The democracies in CEE are not about to collapse because of the rise of populism, yet the populist challenge to liberal democracy has to be taken seriously. While there has been significant progress in the development of ‘electoral democracy’ in the region, constitutional liberalism and the rule of law still remain weak. Only strong, independent, and professional legal institutions and respect for the rule of law can bring further consolidation of democracy in the region.
The article offers an analysis of the particular type of populism that has evolved in Eastern and Central Europe, most notably in Hungary and Poland. The new populism in ECE differs from other populisms because it combines the elements of populism, ethnonationalism, and authoritarianism. Adhering to a similar script, which consists of sustained attacks on rule of law institutions, civil rights and freedoms, the media, and electoral rules, both populist governments in a relatively short period of time dismantled almost all the key cornerstones of democracy in Hungary and Poland. The current surge of populism in ECE demonstrates that constitutional democracy is in great danger when its core principles no longer enjoy wide democratic support. Paradoxically, constitutional democracy can play its “counter-majoritarian” role only when a majority of the people believe that it is the only game in town. Ultimately, democratic political parties and social movements with credible political ideas and programs offer the best hope for the survival of constitutional democracy. The role of law and constitutional checks and balances is less of an essential bulwark against democratic backsliding than is traditionally presumed in the legal literature.
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