Women’s Representation in Politics: Voter Bias, Party Bias, and Electoral Systems

Abstract

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Factors Affecting Internal Party Democracy of The People’s Democratic Party’s Selection of Women Candidates in Nasarawa State, Nigeria

“…Under internal party democracy, voter bias and party bias against women cause underrepresentation of women. Voter bias hurts Spanish women's representation more (Eiras & Sanz, 2018). In Italy and France, voter bias precluded women from serving (Frechette, Maniquet, and Morelli, 2008 as mentioned in Eiras and Sanz, 2018).…”

“…Voter bias hurts Spanish women's representation more (Eiras & Sanz, 2018). In Italy and France, voter bias precluded women from serving (Frechette, Maniquet, and Morelli, 2008 as mentioned in Eiras and Sanz, 2018). Esteve-Volart and Bagues (2012) blamed party bias for the Spanish Senate's lack of women (Eiras and Sanz, 2018).…”

“…In Italy and France, voter bias precluded women from serving (Frechette, Maniquet, and Morelli, 2008 as mentioned in Eiras and Sanz, 2018). Esteve-Volart and Bagues (2012) blamed party bias for the Spanish Senate's lack of women (Eiras and Sanz, 2018). According to informants, voter and party prejudices in Spain, France, and Italy are similar to women's underrepresentation in the PDP internal democracy in Nigeria.…”

District Magnitude and Female Representation: Evidence from Argentina and Latin America

“…To begin with, quotas must be sufficiently generous (Rosen 2017; Schwindt‐Bayer 2009). Placement mandates must prevent party leaders from displacing women to unelectable positions (Jones, Alles, and Tchintian 2012; Rosen 2017; Schwindt‐Bayer 2009), and these mandates must be actively enforced (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005; Htun and Jones 2002; Rosen 2017; Schwindt‐Bayer 2009; Tripp and Kang 2008), which is inherently difficult in open‐list systems (Gonzalez‐Eiras and Sanz 2018; Schwindt‐Bayer 2009; Thames and Williams 2010). The effect of district magnitude is less straightforward.…”

“…Although both factors have received substantial attention from the literature, two issues remain unaddressed. First, although it is widely acknowledged that the effectiveness of quotas depends on their generosity (Rosen 2017; Schwindt‐Bayer 2009), the enforcement of placement mandates (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005; Jones, Alles, and Tchintian 2012; Rosen 2017; Schwindt‐Bayer 2009; Tripp and Kang 2008), and the use of closed lists (Gonzalez‐Eiras and Sanz 2018; Schwindt‐Bayer 2009; Thames and Williams 2010), their interaction with district magnitude has received little attention. Second, whether the positive association between district magnitude and female representation (Krook 2018; Matland 1993; Matland and Taylor 1997; Reynolds 1999; Schwindt‐Bayer 2010) reflects a causal relationship is an open question.…”