How do voters react to shocks that are outside the control of politicians? We address this question by studying the electoral impact of wildfires in Spain in the period 1983-2014. This context allows us to study (a) the effects of fires at different locations and times, as opposed to a specific disaster; (b) the heterogeneous effects by time relative to election day; and (c) the effects on elections for all levels of government. Using a difference-in-difference strategy, we find that an accidental fire up to 9 months ahead of a municipal election increases the incumbent party’s vote share by up to 8 percentage points, whereas a fire earlier in the term does not affect the election results. In addition, fires have no effect on regional or national elections. We discuss the possible mechanisms behind the results in light of the main theories on electoral accountability.
Theories of multilateral bargaining and coalition formation applied to legislatures predict that parties’ seat shares determine their bargaining power. We present findings that are difficult to reconcile with this prediction, but consistent with a norm prescribing that “the most voted party should form the government”. We first present case studies from several countries and regression discontinuity design-based evidence from twenty-eight national European parliaments. We then focus on 2,898 Spanish municipal elections in which two parties tie in the number of seats. We find that the party with slightly more general election votes is substantially more likely to appoint the mayor. Since tied parties should (on average) have equal bargaining power, this identifies the effect of being labeled the most voted. This effect is comparable to that of obtaining an additional seat, and is also present when a right-wing party is the most voted and the second and third most voted parties are allied left-wing parties who can form a combined majority. A model where elections both aggregate information and discipline incumbents can rationalize our results and yields additional predictions we take to the data, such as voters punishing second most voted parties that appoint mayors.
I exploit the unique institutional framework of Spanish local elections, where municipalities follow different electoral systems depending on their population size, as mandated by a national law. Using a regression discontinuity design, I compare turnout under closed-list proportional representation and under an open-list, plurality-at-large system where voters can vote for individual candidates from the same or different party lists. I fi nd that the openlist system increases turnout by between one and two percentage points. The results suggest that open-list systems, which introduce competition both across and within parties, are conducive to greater voter turnout. Keywords: voter turnout, electoral system, open list, regression discontinuity. JEL classifi cation: D72. ResumenEn este artículo se explota el marco institucional de las elecciones municipales españolas, en las que se utilizan distintos sistemas electorales dependiendo del número de habitantes del municipio, según lo establecido por la Ley. Mediante una regresión discontinua, se compara la participación en un sistema de representación proporcional y listas cerradas con otro de listas abiertas, en el que los votantes pueden votar por candidatos individuales de la misma o diferentes listas. Se encuentra que el sistema de listas abiertas incrementa la participación electoral entre uno y dos puntos porcentuales. Los resultados sugieren que los sistemas de listas abiertas, que introducen competencia tanto entre como dentro de los partidos, conducen a más participación electoral.Palabras clave: participación electoral, sistema electoral, listas abiertas, regresión discontinua. Códigos JEL: D72. BANCO DE ESPAÑA 7 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1623
for useful comments. Special thanks to Manu García for invaluable programming help. The opinions and analyses are the responsibility of the authors and, therefore, do not necessarily coincide with those of the Banco de España or the Eurosystem.
Using data from social security records and an event study approach, we estimate the child penalty in Spain, looking at disparities for women and men across different labor outcomes following the birth of the first child. Our findings show that, the year after the first child is born, mothers’ annual earnings drop by 11% while men’s remain unchanged. The gender gap is even larger 10 years after birth. Our estimate of the long-run child penalty in earnings equals 28%, similar to those found for Denmark, Finland, Sweden or the USA. In addition, we identify channels that may drive this phenomenon, including reductions in working days and shifts to part-time or fixed-term contracts. Finally, we provide evidence of heterogeneous responses in earnings and labor market participation by educational level: college-educated women react to motherhood more on the intensive margin (working part-time), while non-college-educated women are relatively more likely to do so in the extensive margin (working fewer days).
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.
hi@scite.ai
10624 S. Eastern Ave., Ste. A-614
Henderson, NV 89052, USA
Copyright © 2024 scite LLC. All rights reserved.
Made with 💙 for researchers
Part of the Research Solutions Family.