Why Williamson Should Be a Sceptic

Abstract

s epistemology leads to a fairly radical version of scepticism. According to him, all knowledge is evidence. It follows that if S knows p, the evidential probability for S that p is . I explain Williamson's infallibilist account of perceptual knowledge, contrasting it with Peter Klein's, and argue that Klein's account leads to a certain problem which Williamson's can avoid. Williamson can allow that perceptual knowledge is possible and that all knowledge is evidence, while at the same time avoiding Klein's problem. But while Williamson can allow that we know some things through experience, there are very many things he must say we cannot know. Given just how very many these are, he should be considered a sceptic.

Evidence and Knowledge

“…So, these beliefs transmit support without generating new support or strengthening old support provided by the evidence. 13 The argument is inspired by an argument of Dodd's (2007) that purports to show that E = K engenders scepticism. Williamson has resources for dealing with Dodd's objection.…”

A Tale of Two Fallibilists: On an Argument for Infallibilism

“…For objections to the link between infallibilism and skepticism see McDowell (2011) and Williamson (2000). For criticism of Williamson see Dodd (2007). 5 It is true that we ourselves have not offered an argument against D2.…”

The Norms of Assertion

“…Douven (2006) andDodd (2007), among others, have also noticed this potential consequence of Williamson's position.10.1057/9781137521729 -The Norms of Assertion, Rachel McKinnonCopyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com -licensed to University of Alberta -PalgraveConnect -2015-08-03…”