Two studies were conducted to investigate aspects of the test effect in a tertiary education setting. During weekly tutorial sessions first year psychology students watched a psychobiology video (Phase 1), followed by different video-related activities (Phase 2). In the tutorial 1 week later, students took an unexpected test (Phase 3). In Phase 2 of Study 1, students completed a quiz in small groups (group quiz) or individually (individual quiz), highlighted the video transcript (re-study), or did nothing further (no-activity). Group quiz performance was superior to individual quiz in both Phase 2 and Phase 3. In Phase 3 individual quiz students performed better than no-activity students, but not better than restudy students. In exploring the individual testing effect further, Phase 2 of Study 2 included quiz (individual), restudy, and no-activity conditions. Quiz participants were presented with one (target) of two sets of questions, whereas restudy participants were presented with equivalent statements. During Phase 3, all participants answered both sets of questions (target and related). Quiz performance was superior to restudy and no-activity performance on both target and related material, supporting the retrieval-induced facilitation explanation of the testing effect. Implications of the current research for assessment practices in classroom settings are discussed, and directions for future research are indicated.

There's been a great deal of interest in epistemology regarding what it takes for a hearer to come to know on the basis of a speaker's say-so. That is, there's been much work on the epistemology of testimony. However, what about when hearers don't believe speakers when they should? In other words, what are we to make of when testimony goes wrong? A recent topic of interest in epistemology and feminist philosophy is how we sometimes fail to believe speakers due to inappropriate prejudicesimplicit or explicit. This is known as epistemic injustice. In this article, I discuss Miranda Fricker's groundbreaking work on epistemic injustice, as well as more recent developments that both offer critique and expansion on the nature and extent of epistemic injustice.

In this paper I discuss the interrelated topics of stereotype threat and attributional ambiguity as they relate to gender and gender identity. The former has become an emerging topic in feminist philosophy and has spawned a tremendous amount of research in social psychology and elsewhere. But the discussion, at least in how it connects to gender, is incomplete: the focus is only on cisgender women and their experiences. By considering trans women's experiences of stereotype threat and attributional ambiguity, we gain a deeper understanding of the phenomena and their problematic effects. 1 AN INCOMPLETE PICTURE OF STEREOTYPE THREAT AND ATTRIBUTIONAL AMBIGUITYIncreasing attention is being paid to stereotype threat in feminist philosophy, and much attention in social psychology. Some dimensions of investigation have been into race, age, and gender forms of stereotype threat. However, little attention has been paid to transgender forms of stereotype threat. 2 In this paper, I discuss some problems with, and sources of, stereotype threat, and some ways in which trans women face unique forms of stereotype threat generally not present for cisgender women, and I connect these discussions to issues surrounding attributional ambiguity. I contend that trans women often experience a dual layer of stereotype threat. This makes the risk of stereotype threat and attributional ambiguity particularly troublesome for trans women. Moreover, by understanding trans women's experiences of stereotype threat and attributional ambiguity, we'll gain a better understanding of the oppressive nature of the phenomena more generally.It's important to note what this paper is not. It's not a paper on stereotypes, or even trans women stereotypes. I won't discuss in detail, for example, how stereotypes arise, or what effects stereotypes have on people aside from the specific phenomenon of stereotype threat. Moreover, this is not a paper on the concept of gender and what trans* identities can teach us about gender.

This article proposes a new account of luck and how luck impacts attributions of credit for agents' actions. It proposes an analogy with the expected value of a series of wagers and argues that luck is the difference between actual outcomes and expected value. The upshot of the argument is that when considering the interplay of intention, chance, outcomes, skill, and actions, we ought to be more parsimonious in our attributions of credit when exercising a skill and obtaining successful outcomes, and more generous in our attributions of credit when exercising a skill but obtaining unsuccessful outcomes. Furthermore, the article argues that when agents skillfully perform an action, they deserve the same amount of credit whether their action is successful or unsuccessful in achieving the goal.

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