Epistemic Injustice

McKinnon, Rachel

doi:10.1111/phc3.12336

Cited by 92 publications

(55 citation statements)

References 66 publications

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“…In the literature on epistemic injustice such lack of awareness of the dominant group as to the power dynamics at work in the systems in which they operate is referred to as epistemology of ignorance. For members of the dominant group seeking to understand the experiences of members of a non-dominant group, the acknowledgement of power differentials is essential given that unawareness of power may mask important aspects of these experiences [25].…”

Section: Unawareness Of Power Differentials Hindering Collaborationmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Legitimacy of User Knowledge in Decision-Making Processes in Mental Health Care: An Analysis of Epistemic Injustice

Grim

Tistad

Schön

et al. 2019

J. Psychosoc. Rehabil. Ment. Health

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The experience-based knowledge of users is considered to provide vital input in shared decision making (SDM). However, mental health service users frequently express having negative experiences from meetings with providers, which are of an epistemic nature (e.g., being ignored or not regarded as credible). This study aimed to explore the barriers involved in legitimizing user knowledge in decision-making processes. Interview data from service users and providers were viewed from a theoretic framework of epistemic injustice. Abductive content analysis was conducted on data collected during a project to develop and implement SDM in mental health services. In describing obstacles to legitimize user knowledge, service users highlighted relational issues: being dependent, often dismissed and choosing to edit their testimonies. Service providers typically described workflow issues, users' insufficient decision-making competence and users' vulnerability to stress factors. The findings suggest that greater epistemic justice might be achieved by a SDM process in which the service user is engaged as a full partner in collaboration in various activities related to their care.

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Section: Unawareness Of Power Differentials Hindering Collaborationmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Legitimacy of User Knowledge in Decision-Making Processes in Mental Health Care: An Analysis of Epistemic Injustice

Grim

Tistad

Schön

et al. 2019

J. Psychosoc. Rehabil. Ment. Health

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“…Expressed more manipulatively and deceptively, epistemic injustice may come to resemble epistemic malevolence as described above. Gaslighting, for example, concerns epistemically unjust actors unjustly manipulating others' realities to cause them to doubt themselves and feel as if they are losing their minds, to find all their testimony discredited and themselves lacking the resources to interpret the very grounds of their reality (Abramson 2014;McKinnon 2016).…”

Section: Epistemic Injusticementioning

confidence: 99%

Epistemic Vices in Organizations: Knowledge, Truth, and Unethical Conduct

Baird

Calvard

2018

J Bus Ethics

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Recognizing that truth is socially constructed or that knowledge and power are related is hardly a novelty in the social sciences. In the twenty-first century, however, there appears to be a renewed concern regarding people's relationship with the truth and the propensity for certain actors to undermine it. Organizations are highly implicated in this, given their central roles in knowledge management and production and their attempts to learn, although the entanglement of these epistemological issues with business ethics has not been engaged as explicitly as it might be. Drawing on work from a virtue epistemology perspective, this paper outlines the idea of a set of epistemic vices permeating organizations, along with examples of unethical epistemic conduct by organizational actors. While existing organizational research has examined various epistemic virtues that make people and organizations effective and responsible epistemic agents, much less is known about the epistemic vices that make them ineffective and irresponsible ones. Accordingly, this paper introduces vice epistemology, a nascent but growing subfield of virtue epistemology which, to the best of our knowledge, has yet to be explicitly developed in terms of business ethics. The paper concludes by outlining a business ethics research agenda on epistemic vice, with implications for responding to epistemic vices and their illegitimacy in practice.

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“…Undoubtedly, social epistemology has quickly become one of the more vibrant subfields in philosophy, and its relatively recent emergence offers a glance into some exciting new directions for our discipline. Social epistemologists have been examining a wide array of topics, from the more traditional, like testimony, expertise, and rational deliberation, to various newcomers such as epistemic injustice (e.g., Burroughs & Tollefsen 2016;Congdon 2015;Fricker 2007;McKinnon 2016), the value (or disvalue) of anonymity (e.g., Frost-Arnold 2014; Goldberg 2013), the epistemic consequences of implicit bias (e.g., Gendler 2011;Jönsson & Sjödahl 2017;Lassiter & Ballantyne 2017;Toribio in press), and conspiracy theories (e.g., Clarke 2007;Coady 2006;Dentith 2014;in press;Levy 2007;Pigden 2007), just to name a few. These inquiries employ an equally wide array of methods.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Unifying Group Rationality

Kopec¹

2019

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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Various social epistemologists employ what seem to be rather distinct notions of group rationality. In this essay, I offer an account of group rationality that is able to unify the dominant notions present in the literature under a single framework. I argue that if we employ a teleological account of epistemic rationality, and then allow that there are many different epistemic goals that are worth pursuing for various groups and individuals, we can then see how those seemingly divergent understandings of group rationality are all intimately related. I close by showing how the view has the additional benefit of allowing us to generate practical, normative suggestions for groups in the real world.

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Epistemic Injustice

Cited by 92 publications

References 66 publications

The Legitimacy of User Knowledge in Decision-Making Processes in Mental Health Care: An Analysis of Epistemic Injustice

The Legitimacy of User Knowledge in Decision-Making Processes in Mental Health Care: An Analysis of Epistemic Injustice

Epistemic Vices in Organizations: Knowledge, Truth, and Unethical Conduct

Unifying Group Rationality

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