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s epistemology leads to a fairly radical version of scepticism. According to him, all knowledge is evidence. It follows that if S knows p, the evidential probability for S that p is . I explain Williamson's infallibilist account of perceptual knowledge, contrasting it with Peter Klein's, and argue that Klein's account leads to a certain problem which Williamson's can avoid. Williamson can allow that perceptual knowledge is possible and that all knowledge is evidence, while at the same time avoiding Klein's problem. But while Williamson can allow that we know some things through experience, there are very many things he must say we cannot know. Given just how very many these are, he should be considered a sceptic.

We highlight various non-standard mechanisms of communication to both motivate our response to what is known as the 'answering machine paradoxes' and to shed light on recent variants of these cases. We claim that the most intuitive solution to these paradoxes requires one to distinguish between the agent (of a context), the tokening of a sentence and the agent's chosen mechanism of communicating this tokening.Keywords Answering machine paradox Á Indexicals Á Context of utterance Á Kaplan Á Predelli Á Pure and impure indexicals Steven Hawking is having a bad day. He has just lost another nurse; the fourth this month. The problem is that the voice synthesizer he uses to communicate has been malfunctioning, 'saying' things that Hawking has not instructed it to say. The first three times it was inconvenient and embarrassing when he 'said' ''I hate you!'' to his worthy nurses, but what he 'said' to this latest nurse was liable to land him with a harassment suit. ''The machine is putting words in my mouth,'' he tells the engineer. ''I am not saying these things!'' Intuitively, Hawking is not saying anything; and the machine (having no communicative intentions) is not saying anything. In fact, nothing is said; no proposition is expressed. We use this case and cases like it to both motivate our response to what is known as the 'answering machine paradoxes' and to shed light on recent variants of these cases. We claim that the most intuitive solution to these paradoxes requires one to distinguish between the agent (of a context), the tokening of a sentence and the agent's chosen mechanism of communicating this tokening.

If one flips an unbiased coin a million times, there are 2