Why Radicalization Fails: Barriers to Mass Casualty Terrorism

Simi, Pete; Windisch, Steven

doi:10.1080/09546553.2017.1409212

Cited by 17 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 29 publications

(22 reference statements)

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“…You depend on your intuition, the idea that something isn't right.' Our results suggest that the interviewed local security professionals are not completely aware of the essence of the (legal) boundaries of the concept of early detection, which takes place during a pre-crime phase [50][51][52], let alone that they are aware of their role within an anticipatory-justice system. We believe this to be a missed opportunity for the effectiveness of counterterrorism policy.…”

Section: Conclusion Discussion and Recommendationsmentioning

confidence: 81%

Early detection of extremism? The local security professional on assessment of potential threats posed by youth

Weert

Eijkman

2019

Crime Law Soc Change

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Frontline professionals such as social workers and civil servants play a crucial role in countering violent extremism. Because of their direct contact with society, firstliners are tasked with detecting individuals that may threaten national security and the democratic rule of law. Preliminary screening takes place during the pre-crime phase. However, without clear evidence or concrete indicators of unlawful action or physical violence, it is challenging to determine when someone poses a threat. There are no set patterns that can be used to identify cognitive radicalization processes that will result in violent extremism. Furthermore, prevention targets ideas and ideologies with no clear framework for assessing terrorism-risk. This article examines how civil servants responsible for public order, security and safety deal with their mandate to engage in early detection, and discusses the side effects that accompany this practice. Based on openinterviews with fifteen local security professionals in the Netherlands, we focus here on the risk assessments made by these professionals. To understand their performance, we used the following two research questions: First, what criteria do local security professionals use to determine whether or not someone forms a potential risk? Second, how do local security professionals substantiate their assessments of the radicalization processes that will develop into violent extremism? We conclude that such initial risk weightings rely strongly on 'gut feelings' or intuition. We conclude that this subjectivity may lead to prejudice and/or administrative arbitrariness in relation to preliminary risk assessment of particular youth.

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Section: Conclusion Discussion and Recommendationsmentioning

confidence: 81%

Early detection of extremism? The local security professional on assessment of potential threats posed by youth

Weert

Eijkman

2019

Crime Law Soc Change

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“…Different forms of violencee.g. interpersonal violence versus mass casualty attacks might be associated with different social and emotional dynamics (Simi & Windisch, 2018). In addition, the relative scarcity of groups willing to deploy lethal force (Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008;LaFree et al, 2010) would seem to indicate that the gradient of escalationthe ease or difficulty with which people might move from one level of violence to the nextis generally steeper in the shift from serious physical harm to lethal force than, say, from fist-fights to fights using non-bladed weapons.…”

Section: Phase I: Establishing the Typology's Scope And Focusmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…4We excluded from our analysis developments within a movement's culture that appeared to limit violence in a way that was overwhelmingly incidental. For example, while there is some evidence that patterns of drug and alcohol consumption affect patterns of violence (Simi & Windisch, 2018), we did not consider general changes in drug and alcohol consumption an internal brake unless this was done explicitly to inhibit violence or public disorder (e.g. Busher, 2016, p. 113).…”

Section: Phase I: Establishing the Typology's Scope And Focusmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Construction of moral norms and evaluations that inhibit certain forms of violence and the emotional impulses towards violence (moral logic) Brake 2 works on moral logic or the 'logics of appropriateness' (Matesan, 2018, p. 6), relating to questions about whether it is right to use violence and if so under what conditions. Moral considerations can comprise a significant barrier to participation in violence (Fiske & Rai, 2015), and where moral brakes falter, this can form a source of discomfort, shame or remorse that might ultimately lead activists to disengage with the group (Bjørgo, 2011;Crenshaw, 1996;Simi & Windisch, 2018).…”

Section: The Typology: Internal Brakes and Their Operating Logicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Alimi, Demetriou, & Bosi, 2015;Borum, 2011;McCauley & Moskalenko, 2017), and while there has also been significant attention given to processes of deescalation or de-radicalisation (e.g. Becker, 2017;Crenshaw, 1991;Cronin, 2009;Ross & Gurr, 1989), processes of non-or limited-escalationwhy extremists or extremist groups don't do more violence than they dohave received far less attention (Bjørgo & Gjelsvik, 2017;Cragin, 2014;Simi & Windisch, 2018). Where they have received attention, the primary focus has tended to be primarily on the non-radicalisation of individuals (Cragin, 2014;Jaskoski, Wilson, & Lazareno, 2017;Knight, Woodward, & Lancaster, 2017;Simi & Windisch, 2018) rather than on group-or movement-level processes; or on identifying the differing characteristics between less and more violent organisations (Asal, Schulzke, & Pate, 2017;Chermak et al, 2013) research which, while insightful, tells us relatively little about how violent escalation is inhibited.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The internal brakes on violent escalation: a typology

Busher

Holbrook

Macklin

2018

Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression

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Most groups do less violence than they are capable of. Yet while there is now an extensive literature on the escalation of or radicalisation towards violence, particularly by 'extremist' groups or actors, and while processes of de-escalation or de-radicalisation have also received significant attention, processes of non-or limited escalation have largely gone below the analytical radar. This article contributes to current efforts to address this limitation in our understanding of the dynamics of political aggression by developing a descriptive typology of the 'internal brakes' on violent escalation: the mechanisms through which members of the groups themselves contribute to establish and maintain limits upon their own violence. We identify five underlying logics on which the internal brakes operate: strategic, moral, ego maintenance, outgroup definition, and organisational. The typology is developed and tested using three very different case studies: the transnational and UK jihadi scene from 2005 to 2016; the British extreme right during the 1990s, and the animal liberation movement in the UK from the mid-1970s until the early 2000s.

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