Why has Not There been More Research of Concern?

Rappert, Brian

doi:10.3389/fpubh.2014.00074

Cited by 12 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 73 publications

(89 reference statements)

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Another example is the assumption that scientists are best placed to govern themselves, which is at the heart of the DURC policies, despite scientists not necessarily having training to identify security risks. This assumption is so firmly rooted in biosecurity governance that questioning it is difficult, and even when it is questioned, gathering evidence to inform governance redesign is challenging (12). However, scientists may have the requisite knowledge to identify measures for assessing and reducing identified risks.…”

Section: Governance As An Experimentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Embrace experimentation in biosecurity governance

Evans

Beal

Berger

et al. 2020

Science

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

Section: Governance As An Experimentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…11 Engineer Research and Development Center, U.S. Army, Vicksburg, MS, USA. 12 Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, USA. 13 Pirbright Institute, Pirbright, UK.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Embrace experimentation in biosecurity governance

Evans

Beal

Berger

et al. 2020

Science

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…While it is possible that dual-use research is quite rare, it is more likely the research community is just unable to recognize research as dangerous due to lack of training and proper guidance (Casadevall et al 2015). In light of publications, such as the papers detailing the synthesis of poliovirus (Cello, Paul & Wimmer 2002) and the reconstruction of the 1918 flu virus (Tumpey et al 2005), perhaps the H5N1 influenza papers are most notable in that they actually started a significant public debate over biosecurity policy (Rappert 2014).…”

Section: Prefacementioning

confidence: 99%

Assessing the Benefits of Research

2020

Dangerous Science Science: Policy and Risk Analysis for Scientists and Engineers

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Writing a book requires a substantial time commitment, and I would like to thank my family for their patience. It also requires resources, and I would like to thank Stony Brook University and the Department of Technology and Society in particular for its support. Thanks also goes out to David Tonjes for his helpful advice and Scott Ferson for his gracious support and instructive discussions regarding the nature of risk and the measurement of uncertainty. I must also express my deep gratitude to the late David Ferguson, instrumental in my academic career, who imparted kindness and wisdom in equal measure. Finally, I would like to thank Sheldon Reaven for our numerous conversations on the philosophy of science, science policy, and opera. The value of his insightful comments has been exceeded only by the value of his friendship. This book has also benefitted from the insightful peer review comments provided by Professor Frederic Emmanuel Bouder. Case Study: H5N1 Influenza Research Debate Media coverage of the latest scientific discoveries and technological innovations is usually enthusiastic. Long-standing questions are answered, productivity is increased, health is improved, and our standard of living is raised-all due to modern science and human ingenuity. However, sometimes the results of research can also inspire public fear and outrage. Let us consider a recent example. In September 2011, Dutch virologist Ron Fouchier announced at a conference in Malta that his research team had recently engineered a version of the H5N1 1 avian influenza virus that was highly transmissible between mammals. Shortly thereafter, virologist Yoshihiro Kawaoka of the University of Wisconsin presented results from a similar study. The subsequent media coverage scared the general public and set off demands for a review of how science research is assessed, funded, and managed. Why would these studies be so scary? The reason centers on the lethal potential of influenza and the H5N1 virus in particular. An influenza pandemic typically occurs when a flu virus substantially different from circulating viruses mutates to become easily transmissible between humans. The combination of 1 The formal naming convention for influenza viruses includes the antigenic type (A, B, or C); the originating host (e.g., swine); the geographical origin; year of identification; strain number; or for type A viruses, the specific subtypes of two surface proteins, hemagglutinin (H) and neuraminidase (N) (e.g., H5N1) (Assaad et al. 1980). Given the complexity of formal names, popular shorthand names, such as Spanish flu, Swine flu, and H1N1 can potentially be referring to the same influenza virus. The World Health Organization has been working to improve shorthand names to make them less stigmatizing and more informative.

show abstract

“… Rappert (2014) examines the limitations of this risk-benefit framing of experiments of concern, and highlights that benefits are as challenging to anticipate as risks, and both could be subject to different interpretations. Interestingly, the idea that “pieces of research” can be assessed as inherently dangerous or not contradicts the routine claim that science is neutral and only becomes value-laden when used by specific actors.…”

Section: Misdirected Policiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Negotiating the dynamics of uncomfortable knowledge: The case of dual use and synthetic biology

2014

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Institutions need to ignore some knowledge in order to function. This is “uncomfortable knowledge” because it undermines the ability of those institutions to pursue their goals (Rayner, 2012). We identify three bodies of knowledge that are relevant to understandings of the dual use threat posed by synthetic biology but are excluded from related policy discussions. We demonstrate how these “unknown knowns” constitute uncomfortable knowledge because they disrupt the simplified worldview that underpins contemporary discourse on the potential misuse of synthetic biology by malign actors. We describe how these inconvenient truths have been systematically ignored and argue that this is because they are perceived as a threat by organisations involved in the promotion of synthetic biology as well as by those involved in managing biosecurity risks. This has led to a situation where concerns about the biosecurity threat posed by synthetic biology are not only exaggerated, but are, more importantly, misplaced. This, in turn, means that related policies are misdirected and unlikely to have much impact. We focus on the dynamics of discussions about synthetic biology and dual use to demonstrate how the same “knowns” that are denied or dismissed as “unknown knowns” in certain circumstances are sometimes mobilised as “known knowns” by the same category of actors in a different context, when this serves to sustain the goals of the individuals and institutions involved. Based on our own experience, we argue that negotiating the dynamics of uncomfortable knowledge is a difficult, but necessary, component of meaningful transdisciplinary collaborations.

show abstract

Why has Not There been More Research of Concern?

Cited by 12 publications

References 73 publications

Embrace experimentation in biosecurity governance

Embrace experimentation in biosecurity governance

Assessing the Benefits of Research

Negotiating the dynamics of uncomfortable knowledge: The case of dual use and synthetic biology

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About